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by
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ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of land vacancy in Kuwait's city center and its
adverse effect on both the image of the city and land economics was
investigated, and issues of symbolism, character, and identity were
addressed. In addition to the description of the physical and natural
environments, social context, and postwar policies and their impacts
were discussed.
The history of the city center's physical evolution since the eigh-
teenth century, before and after the discovery of oil, was analyzed.
Causes of the problem were identified through the examination of
previous plans, reviews, and studies that had been carried out since
the early fifties to respond to the quality of the city center's environ-
ment.
Questions and concerns for future plans were addressed and
alternative visions for the city center were suggested. Changes in
public policies and implementation mechanisms were explored, as
well as tools that need to be used to make implementation of future
plans more successful.
Thesis Supervisor: Gary Hack
Title: Professor of Urban Design
Thesis Supervisor: Julian Beinart
Title: Professor of Architecture
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Preface
The research for a thesis topic was initiated by my direct
interaction with Kuwait City as a resident of almost thirteen years,
and by my professional experience with both local and international
consultants on a variety of projects in the Middle East. Kuwait
City's continuous process of demolishing and physically emptying
its center, the increase of land vacancy in the center, and the rapid
expansion of the city towards the desert had all intrigued me as an
unusual phenomenon. I had also realized that the vast unbuilt areas
in the center have a negative impact on the image of the city.
Questions such as why the center has taken this form, why
only the center has not been developed, and why the center does
not have an attractive environment and special character remained
in my mind. Observations, questions, and concerns such as western
intervention, dealing with the past, character and identity developed
over time; they became clear and were articulated only after coming
to MIT and being nurtured in an academic environment that helped
me to formulate my area of inquiry.
The thesis research and field work, which included interviews
with planning officials, data collection, review of previous plans and
studies, photographic survey, and collection of aerial photographs
began in January, 1990. The Iraqi invasion in August, 1990 and the
Gulf War in early 1991 rendered this effort impossible. Since the
filing system of Kuwait Municipality and the library of its Urban
Design Section were both looted and damaged during the invasion,
I had to limit my research to the material I had obtained earlier and
to some personal documents sent to me from Kuwait after the liberation.
Despite the delays and difficulties for carrying out this thesis
research, the need for this kind of study by professionals familiar
with the culture, coupled with the Kuwaiti decision makers'
encouragement and my advisors' persistence and support, motivat-
ed me to continue my research and finish the thesis. My hope for
the future is that other experienced professionals from this region
will continue to inquire into and research these issues and to initiate
special mid-career programs and other educational exchanges
specifically oriented to this part of the Middle East, making use of
the advanced techniques and resources available in the United
States and Europe.
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Introduction
This thesis explores the problem of empty land in the center
of Kuwait City, which started to appear in the late 1950's as a result
of the sudden oil prosperity and the subsequent urban moderniza-
tion. The land vacancy has adverse economic and aesthetic implica-
tions. The old residential neighborhoods in the traditional city were
demolished and replaced by expansive empty lots that have been
neglected and remain unused, in spite of the persistent planning
efforts over the last four decades.
Through the historical survey and analysis of the center's
physical evolution, it became possible to define some of the causes
of problems of land vacancy and delays in plan implementation.
The main objectives of the thesis are not only to define the problem
and its causes, but also to envision future solutions and delineate
areas of possible public intervention.
The thesis is divided into three parts: present, past, and
future. The first part (The Present) describes the problem and its
context. The first chapter states the problem, and discusses issues of
aesthetics and symbolism. It also deals with land economics and
governmental acknowledgement of the problem. The second chapter
portrays the physical and natural environments, social context, and
postwar realities and policies.
The second part of the thesis (The Past), which comprises
three chapters, is a historical analysis of the center's physical
transformation and the planning efforts for developing the tradition-
al city (Kuwait Town) into a modern and significant capital city
center. The third chapter traces the history of the physical form of
the traditional city, from its establishment in the eighteenth century
up to the period of oil discovery and exploitation in the late forties.
The next chapter (Chapter 4) is an overview of the different
planning efforts that have taken place since the early fifties. Since
analyzing and evaluating the different plans, reviews, and studies
is difficult without understanding the contextual events, it became
necessary to include the international and regional events that
directly and indirectly influenced the development process. The last
chapter of this part (Chapter 5) pinpoints the causes and major
participants that contributed to the creation of the emptiness in the
center of Kuwait City. The acknowledgement of past obstacles is the
first step in improving the urban environment of the center.
The last part (The Future) mainly concerns questions of how
to resolve the center's development dispute. The first chapter of this
part (Chapter 6) addresses issues need that need to be considered
for proposed solutions; it also suggests five different options for the
center's future vision. For each of these visions, there is an analysis
of its advantages and disadvantages, in light of the prevailing
circumstances. The last chapter of this part (Chapter 7), which is
also the last chapter of the thesis, pertains to the implementation
process. It discusses different government policies and actions that
are necessary for implementing one or a combination of visions; this
chapter delineates the areas of public intervention that would be
required to bring the theoretical concepts into reality.
The thesis is organized in this manner to separate issues
related to period and to guide the reader through different stages
of the center's physical transformations. It was necessary to begin
the thesis with an elaborate explanation and definition of the
problem, with all its contextual circumstances, in order to learn
lessons from past experience, investigate and propose solutions for
the present situation, and achieve better results in the future.
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Part I: The Present
The Problem of Land Vacancy and its Context
Since the discovery of oil in the Arabian Gulf', cities in this
region have undergone rapid, visible physical transformations as a
result of the sudden economic, social and political changes. The Gulf
cities not only share postcolonial cities' problems resulting from
modernization and western intervention, they also share some
unique characteristics that make them different from cities in other
developing countries. Some of these characteristics are an abun-
dance of financial resources, a small population, a dependency on
expatriate labor, and a limited technical capacity. In addition to their
location in an extremely hot, arid region, cities in the Gulf have
some peculiarities: for example, natives are often a minority in their
country and gasoline is less expensive than bottled water.
The manifestations of the sudden economic changes in the
region took different forms in different cities. For example, some of
the traditional cities survived destruction and coexist with new
development, some were completely rebuilt, and the rest of the
traditional cities were haphazardly demolished and new construc-
tion took place. In what is now Kuwait City, the abrupt changes
resulted in the destruction of the traditional city (Kuwait Town,
which currently comprises the new city center) and its replacement
*Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United
Arab Emirates.
with scattered modern developments and a considerable area of
land vacancy.
The objectives of this part of the study are to define the
problem of land vacancy in the center of Kuwait City and the
subsequent aesthetic and economic implications. In Chapter 1 there
will be a description of the built form and vacant land in the city
center, as well as a discussion of why and to whom land vacancy
is a problem and why it is important to have significant center.
Cemetery in the Center
[Fig. 1] Views of empty land in different parts of the center
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[Fig. 2] 1960's residential architecture
[Fig. 3] Architecture of the 1980's
Chapter 1: The Problem of Land Vacancy
The City Center's Physical Environment
Kuwait City center's inland boundaries are defined by Soor
Street [Soor means wall], which was built on the alignment of the
old city wall. Adding the unoccupied areas of the undeveloped
Green Belt* and the unornamented cemeteries (The Wahabi sect of
Islam to which most Kuwaitis adhere does not recognize large,
formal gravestones) to the other vacant land in the center, the first
striking view of the center is vast abandoned spaces surrounded by
modern high-rise buildings. The hollowness of the center emphasiz-
es both the harsh barren environment and the discontinuity in the
urban form [Fig. 1].
The architecture of the buildings in the center represent a
hodge-podge of architectural styles developed over the last forty
years. These styles range from the early fifties' simple three to four
storey buildings up to the eighties' high-rise buildings [Fig. 2,3]. The
different architectural styles represent the public taste of the times,
the available technical and professional resources, and the existing
financial resources. While the styles of the fifties and sixties mainly
exemplify the work of Egyptian architects and Lebanese contractors
employed at that time, the seventies and eighties witnessed the
introduction of international architects and contractors into Kuwait
City.
The Green Belt was an open space initially proposed in the 1952
Master Plan which was partially developed but remained mostly
conceptual in subsequent plans and reviews.
High-rise buildings went up between old mud brick houses,
highways replaced the desert routes and the narrow alleyways, and
modern ports supplanted the old harbor and the simple jetties.
Building construction occurred only on the edges of city blocks,
leaving behind empty lots, which are used for parking. City blocks
differ in size, shape, and area; the largest of the vacant lots are not
useful for parking because of the intense heat and lack of protection
for both cars and people.
The few buildings that survived the destruction of the old
city are public buildings, mosques, some prominent merchant
families' houses [Fig. 4] and diwaniyas [the part of the house used
for men's formal gatherings] and some of the souqs [traditional
covered bazaars] which were recently demolished during the Iraqi
occupation of 1990-91. Except for very small areas, residential
neighborhoods suffered most from the demolition. The vacant land
is a painful reminder of the old city and its disrupted history, or as
Yi-Fu Tuan describes it "the locus of memories."1 The skyline has
been altered; the new telecommunication tower which rises 372
meters above ground, Kuwait Towers, and the minaret of the State
Mosque dwarf the older significant landmarks of the city such as
the Sief Palace* tower and the minarets of the adjacent mosques
[Fig. 5].
Another notable feature in the city center is the wide road
network and wide setbacks. The combination of the width of the
streets and width of the setbacks intensify the dislocated sensation
created by the vacant land. Buildings in the city center lack tying
elements and anchorage; surrounded and separated by the empty
* The Sief Palace is the original and oldest headquarters for the
ruler.
[Fig. 4] Preserved old merchant family house on the seaside
[Fig. 51 New telecommunication tower dwarfs minarets
[Fig. 6] Buildings in the center need
settings and tying elements
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lots, the buildings look unrelated to each other and need to be
coordinated [Fig. 6].
The present city center lacks civic sense; it does not have
grand and elegant places such as public parks, landmarks and
plazas, nor does it have prominent and distinguished architecture.
It does not communicate the importance and ambience of the place
or invoke the feelings of respect and reverence associated with
stately and special places in the city such as large mosque enclo-
sures or boulevards. There is no remarkable contrast in the built
environment of the city such as open and enclosed, or dark and
light spaces. Traditional cities in the region used to have such
contrasts. They used to have public spaces in the souq area or in
front of the Friday mosque which were contrasted by the privacy of
the inner courtyards of the houses; the dark shaded souqs countered
the unbearable heat and glare of the sun.
[Fig. 7] Soor Street
Not only does the center have undeveloped land, physical
boundaries are also not fully developed. Part of the waterfront in
the center has not yet been developed; the center's seaside boundary
is the heavily travelled Arabian Gulf Road,* which is used to both
cross and approach the city center. Soor Street, which is the inland
boundary, is also adjacent to the partially developed Green Belt
[Fig. 7,8].
The Developed Segment of the Green Belt
[Fig. 8] The Green Belt
* The Arabian Gulf Road is a six lane urban expressway with a
wide middle island and sidewalks.
1932
1952
[Fig. 9] Sequence of aerial photographs of the city center
Source: Kuwait Municipality
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Statement of the Problem
In Kuwait City, since the establishment of the settlement in
the early eighteenth century and despite the continuous process of
demolition and destruction of the traditional city within the wall
and its replacement by the present city center (which is still referred
to as Kuwait Town), this part of Kuwait continues to be the locus
of the center of power, religion, and major economic activities. The
city of Kuwait is not only the capital city and major port city, but
it is the primate city where the majority of Kuwait's population
resides. To date, in spite of persistent planning efforts over the last
forty years, the city center still suffers from disordered development
and large holes of neglected land and their subsequent impacts on
the image and economic vitality of the city. The empty lots are
concentrated in large areas of the center and are in a prime location
in terms of real estate value and the sea view [Fig. 10]. Because of
this concentration, the vacant land is conspicuous and has an
adverse effect on the quality of the physical environment, character,
and image of the city.
[Fig. 10] Map showing the extent of land vacancy
The physical area of the city center is relatively small.
Excluding the area of the Green Belt, the center's area is about 8.5
square kilometers from the Arabian Gulf Road to Soor Street. The
vacant land constitutes about seventy percent of land available for
development, which includes cemeteries and secondary roads
within blocks2 and does not include major roads and setbacks. The
government owns about 75% of this vacant land.3 In a wealthy city
like Kuwait, such a high percentage of vacant land is an eyesore
and constitutes an underutilization of city resources. While some of
the center's activities such as service ministries, retail centers,
government institutions and professional offices moved out of the
center, the core of the center contains the complex for the Amiri
Diwan and the Sief Palace (the current headquarters for the ruler),
the office of the Crown Prince, Council of Ministers, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Planning Board, Parliament, and Court houses, in
addition to important and symbolic decision-making ministries such
as Religious Endowments, Planning, Finance & Commerce, Industry,
Oil, and Justice [Fig. 11].
Milnry of c F ig Affas Ministry of Planning \uwait Towers
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
State Mosque
Stock Exchange TV,
Amiri Diwan &
Sief alaceDasman PalaceSief Palace "
Mubarkiya Souq
National Museum - Green Belt
Parliament
Salhiya Cemetery Telecommunication Tower
[Fig. 11] Map showing major activities
The center also contains the State Mosque, Stock Exchange,
Central Bank, National Museum, Kuwait Municipality, Government
and other headquarters and public institutions. Future public
institutions such as the Audit Bureau and National Library will also
be located in the center. Commercial and special retail activities still
function in the center, either in the Souq or in newly developed
shopping malls and shopping centers. Private commercial offices,
services, hotels, and some entertainment activities are still located
in the center of the city.
In the city center, the most noticeable decline--both in umber
and quality--has been in the residential use. Most of the center's
original inhabitants have moved to villas outside the wall. Recently
some Kuwaitis agreed to move in to the empty ten year old high-
rise public apartment buildings [Fig. 12]. Existing housing in the
center is mainly occupied by either single non-Kuwaiti or expatriate
families (that is, before August, 1990); lower income people live in
the run-down apartment buildings of the early 1960's and wealthier
families inhabit some of the modern apartment buildings. Non-
Kuwaitis mostly live in rented apartment buildings since they are
not allowed to own property in Kuwait. Unlike the city center, the
surrounding and newly created residential neighborhoods are fully
developed and plans for these areas were implemented as they were
designed according to the Master Plans, reviews and studies that
followed [Fig. 13]. The same is also true for the highways and road
networks: the plans were implemented everywhere except for inside
the city center.
The physical planning efforts have been ongoing since the
first Master Plan for the city of Kuwait in 1952. Kuwaitis were keen
and persistent about the implementation of plans. What went
[Fig. 121 Al-Sawaber housing complex (for Kuwaitis)'
[Fig. 13] 1987 aerial photograph showing the fully developed residential
neighborhoods outside the center
Source: Kuwait Municipality
wrong, and why were plans not implemented in the city center? The
Kuwaitis lost their old city and have not yet seen an alternative
suitable for their needs, culture, and climate. The land vacancy
phenomenon has two effects: aesthetic and economic. Aesthetically,
the city center has lost its identity, character, and sense of place.
Unlike cities in the Gulf region such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and
Bahrain, which underwent similar socio-economic changes yet have
a special character that distinguish each of them, Kuwait city does
not have a significant and special image. Economically, the city is
not using its assets productively. The prime real estate properties
are sitting idle and missing growth opportunities. Physically, the
center has not been fully developed, resulting in the discontinuity
in the built form and the image of dispersion in the city center.
In order to fully understand the problem of land vacancy and
to have better insight into its aesthetic, economic, and physical
implications, a thorough and comprehensive description is required
for the city center. A description of its aesthetic qualities which
includes meanings and symbols, character and identity, as well as
the sensory qualities of the place, will shed light on the importance
of developing the city center and recreating a sense of place for it.
In the words of E Relph (1976), who discussed the sense of place
and its importance for people:
A deep human need exists for associations with significant
places. If we choose to ignore that need, and to allow the
forces of placelessness to continue unchallenged, then the
future can only hold an environment in which places
simply do not matter. If, on the other hand, we choose to
respond to that need and to transcend placelessness, then
the potential exists for the development of an environment
in which places are for men, reflecting and enhancing the
variety of human experience.'
In the process of developing the traditional city and trans-
forming it to the capital city center, the traditional city of Kuwait
has been replaced by a multitude of architectural attempts to
establish and recreate a new image for the city. These attempts
range from the rebuilding of the local architecture to the introduc-
tion of state-of-the-art architectural designs.
The extensive land vacancy in the center disrupted the
historical continuity and detached people from their place of
heritage and belonging. Emotionally, the people of Kuwait Town are
still very attached and sentimental about their old city and its
memory; unfortunately, the place they used to live in and interact
with has been destroyed and transformed into vacant land. From
what remains of the old traditional city, it has become hard to read
and understand the history of the city [Fig. 14].
Meanings and symbols
On the production of meaning, Relph further defines:
Places are not abstractions or concepts, but are directly
experienced phenomena of the lived-world and hence are full
with meanings, with real objects, and with ongoing activi-
ties.5
The city center was deprived of its animation and its sense
of continuity when lively residential neighborhoods and their
related services moved out of the city center. People are experienc-
ing the city center less because there is less direct interaction within
its environment. The few scattered mosques left in the vacant land,
which used to serve the surrounding residential neighborhoods for
[Fig. 14] The replacement of the traditional city
daily prayers, lost their relevance when the residences were
demolished. Similarly, the handful of remaining diwaniyas and
houses which used to be part of the organic fabric of the city now
sit in the middle of the sand and dust, exposed to the desert
harshness and wilderness [Fig. 15]. Buildings from the old city were
not designed as free-standing structures but as blocks of connecting
[Fig. 14] The replacement of the traditional city
daily prayers, lost their relevance when the residences were
demolished. Similarly, the handful of remaining diwaniyas and
houses which used to be part of the organic fabric of the city now
sit in the middle of the sand and dust, exposed to the desert
harshness and wilderness [Fig. 15]. Buildings from the old city were
not designed as free-standing structures but as blocks of connecting
Because the present city center still functions as the symbol
of government, religious, and economic powers, its symbolic
meaning needs better presentation in its architecture and built form.
The center needs more meaningful landmarks and urban elements
that express its legitimacy6 and transcendence7 such as boulevards,
monuments, and public places.! The capital city center's power
could be better expressed by ceremonial buildings, monumental
landmarks, and ambient public infrastructure that emphasize its
significance and replace the land vacancy.
Character and Identity
The capital city should be a symbol of national pride: capital
cities around the world, such as Washington, D.C., Paris, or London,
express a sense of power and prestige. The elements of urban
design and the architectural styles used give these capital cities their
unique character and unmistakable identity. By comparison, the
present city center of Kuwait has a remarkable absence of these
qualities. The center lacks memorable and enjoyable urban and
human places for the residents of the city.
They are important sources of individual and communal
identity, and are often profound centers of human existence
to which people have deep emotional and psychological ties.'
Yi-Fu Tuan (1974)
The handful of landmarks in the city such as the Sief Palace
and Kuwait Towers give the city its present limited imageability.
Kuwait Towers, built in the early 1970's, became a powerful
landmark and national symbol due to its form, color, height,
location, and most important, its vertical contrast with the flat desert
[Fig. 16]. Unless there is an immediate action to improve and control
the quality of the physical environment in the city center, these
landmarks will soon also lose their scale and meaning in the
changing context. A major effort is desperately needed to solve the
[Fig. 16] Kuwait Towers
J~3
[Fig. 17] Destruction of Kuwaiti identity
Source: AI-Bayan Newspaper, U.A.E, 1990
problem of the vacant land, to develop and integrate this land with
the rest of the city center in order to establish a unified framework
that gives the center a sense of order and harmony and subsequent-
ly a special spirit, character, and identity [Fig. 17]. The issue of
national identity has acquired more importance since the Iraqi
invasion, which aimed to destroy the Kuwaiti identity and eradicate
its symbols (the Sief Palace, national museum, and the wall gates)
[Fig. 18]. Even the dhow [trading ship] that was exhibited in the
museum garden to represent Kuwait's seafaring heritage was
burned by the Iraqis. More than ever before, Kuwait city needs to
reestablish its national identity and recreate a city center with a
unique and distinguished character.
Sensory Qualities
Tuan talks about topophelia, or the love, sentiment and
emotion people feel for a place." The vacant land in the center does
not evoke any of these positive feelings: people do not experience
or feel the vacant land as a place" because they do not use it. It
physically isolates individual activities13 and it separates the people
[Fig. 18] Sief Palace after the invasion
Source: U.S Army Corps of Engineers, 1991 A1
from these activities--the last thing one wants to encounter on a
summer day in Kuwait City is an open space. Unprotected space
means sun, glare, dust and sand during the day, darkness and
desolation at night.
It is a void; it does not have natural features such as greenery
or water that touch feelings or leave positive impressions that reside
in the memory. The artificially controlled environment in the
buildings surrounding these dead parts of the city further severs the
people from their sensory experience; they no longer have the direct
experience of their natural and physical environment that they had
in the old city. For example, the surviving souqs in the city center,
such as Souq Al-Hareem (women's market), Souq Al-Silah (weapons
market), Souq Al-Zel (carpets and men's formal costumes), and Souq
Al-Chai (tea and spice market), used to have these sensory qualities.
They have retained the richness of traditions and cultural values:
the traditional costumes, the aroma of the cardamom and coffee,
and the smell of burnt incense and essences, the sound of the call
to prayer, and the colors and textures of the desert [Fig. 19]. As
Tuan says, "smell and odor evoke vivid and emotionally charged
memories.""4 One can feel and sense the local culture and climate,
[Fig. 191 The Souq in Mubarakiya
Source: Laurence Vale, 1990
the shaded souqs provide a feeling of coolness and protection from
the heat and glare of the sun, and from sand storms. Moreover,
souqs also provide a location for social interactions and leisure that
makes the experience of marketing exciting and enjoyable.
In its current state of neglect, the city center of Kuwait will
entirely lose its connections with its original traditions, authenticity,
and values that differentiate cities in the Gulf region from other
cities in the world.
Land Economics
As a result of development plans, government land acquisi-
tion policy, and speculation that followed (the process will be more
thoroughly described in Part II), the land values in the city center
kept increasing until it became unfeasible to develop for both the
private and public sectors. The land market in Kuwait City is not a
market in the traditional sense: land prices are inflated and
unrealistic. Commercial offices are moving out of the center because
of the sky-rocketing rents and it is unfeasible for the government to
utilize the vacant land for public housing projects unless it builds
high-rise residential buildings which are strongly resented by the
Kuwaitis. Instead of being a resource for development and economic
growth, vacant land in the center became a burden on both the
government and private land owners.
Services ministries and other public services and institutions
moved out or are planning to move away from the city center in
order to decrease traffic congestion and relieve the radial roads that
lead into the center. As a result, the expected land vacancy and the
number of abandoned structures are increasing. The vacant land has
become a tool for speculation in the hands of the private sector.
Development of land in the center has become impossible
without a significant increase in development density. So far, the
FAR (floor area ratio) for private commercial development has been
increased twice. Additionally, private land owners in the center
have exerted pressure to change usage from residential to commer-
cial because residential development is not as profitable as commer-
cial and retail enterprises. The technical officials at Kuwait's
Municipality, which is the responsible authority, feel that any
increase in density would lead to an increased pressure on the
existing infrastructure, and are concerned that its capacity will not
be sufficient for the demand generated by the additional develop-
ment according to increased density zoning. As a result, the
Municipality had to put a freeze on commercial development in the
center and on all traffic and transportation projects in the city
center.
At the present time, especially after the invasion and war,
there is no economic pressure to build in the city center. There are
no incentives for the private sector to build and the government has
other priorities (dealing with the aftermath of the war). Unless a
major change in the policy of improving the quality of the environ-
ment in the city center takes place, there will be no driving force for
developing the center to its full capacity and potential. For the time
being, the land market is inactive and the demand for commercial
and residential development is not clear because of postwar
economic, social, and political changes. Demand for rental residen-
tial development will be much less than it was before the invasion,
not to mention demand for public services and hence commercial
and retail developments.
Since the government of Kuwait is the principal land owner
in the center, the problem of land vacancy is a main concern for
technical officials in the government. In light of urgent demand for
land for public housing, the National Housing Authority and
Kuwait's Municipality are facing the problem of finding land
sufficient for public housing. Since the Municipality has exhausted
its capacity for providing land for NHA (villa-type) housing
projects, a recent study has been carried out by KISR (Kuwait
Institute for Scientific Research) using the Landsat satellite to
delineate areas having the lowest development density in the city.
Government officials are focusing their attention on vacant
land in the center for public housing projects. But this approach also
has its drawbacks: first, Kuwaitis would need to accept living in
apartments instead of villas; second, the NHA has a limited
implementation capacity; and finally, there is the question of
whether to allow non-natives to live in the center. Vacant land in
the center is not only an NHA problem, responsible officials at the
municipality are also confronting the problem of development,
increase of FAR, providing sufficient infrastructure, and implement-
ing master plans and revisions.
Private property and land owners in the city center also
suffer from the land vacancy dilemma. Those who have not already
developed their land are not able to develop it now because of
economic unfeasibility and the recent freeze on development. Prop-
erty owners with developed land are not increasing their equity due
to underdevelopment of the center in general.
The public also pays a price for land vacancy; regardless of
their level of income or nationality, inhabitants of the city all share
the discomfort and disadvantages resulting from vacant land. They
all suffer from the traffic, parking, and the car-oriented built
environment; the social cost of the land vacancy is that people need
to travel longer distances and to use their cars in order to move
from one block to another. Additionally, the vacant land does not
provide an urban feel, weather protection or security that would
enhance the social qualities of the city center.
Realization of the problem
Up until the late eighties, government officials in Kuwait
believed that Kuwait had developed an effective and successful
physical planning system and that Kuwaitis were the pioneers in
city planning in the Gulf region. Since 1988, however, the people
and government officials of Kuwait began to realize that other cities
in the Gulf have more beautiful and successful urban environments.
Despite the fact that some of these cities had the same British
planners, their centers are livelier and more densely developed and
inhabited than the city center of Kuwait. For example, Abu Dhabi
is green and its waterfront is more integrated with the city than that
of Kuwait City.
During my interviews with the highest level of government
officials concerned, all acknowledged that the city and especially the
center has not been developed to its potential as an attractive and
liveable city center. They felt that the center suffers from traffic
congestion, an inadequate number of parking spaces, and very few
quality pedestrian environments and protected shaded areas. All
professional officials complained about the lack of aesthetic
expression and the absence of a special and coherent character for
the city center.
Although the policy makers and high government officials
differ in their views and future visions, they all shared the vision
that the city center should be maintained as the seat of the state and
should house the decision-making agencies in addition to the
financial, commercial, cultural, and entertainment activities. They
agreed that for reasons of national security the center should be
repopulated solely by Kuwaitis. Officials interviewed acknowledged
the need for better and more prestigious architectural representation
and powerful expressions in the city center's built form. Following
is a summary of some of the remarks made by these officials:
- Need to restore the old city
- City does not have a special character
- Unsuccessful architectural expressions
- City needs identity
- Does not have the spirit of a city
- City has a strange character
- Distorted facades
- City does not have harmony
- Uncoordinated buildings
- No unified framework
- City planned by transportation planners without any
consideration for pedestrians
Some of the high government officials believe that the vacant
land is not a serious problem for the government and the decision
to develop it need not be made immediately and at one time, and
that it is better to have the land reserve in the center for future, as
yet unplanned projects.
The officials in Kuwait have begun to acknowledge the
failure of the previous Master Plans in developing Kuwait Town as
a significant city center; the plans were implemented everywhere
but in the city center. The problem is not only in the implemen-
tation of the plans; but also in that the plans themselves have prob-
lems. The plans assumed an implementation capacity that did not
[Fig. 201 Kuwait's City center lacks cohesiveness, character, and identity
Source: Kuwait Municipality, Historical Preservation Study; old Kuwait
Town, Kuwait, 1988
exist. In an interview, the director of NHA mentioned that the
current city center's empty blocks are fragmented by the new
secondary roads and are only developed at the road edges, leaving
the inner parts of the blocks underdeveloped.
Kuwait Municipality is the town planning authority responsi-
ble for physical policy, urban developments, municipal services,
land control and land transactions for the entire state of Kuwait.
Kuwait Municipality is headed by a Minister of Municipal affairs,
who is supported by a Municipal Council. Planning proposals are
prepared in-house by officers of the Municipality and approved by
the Council and relevant committees. The Council of Ministers has
to approve or reject planning proposals. However, the implementa-
tion of planning decisions involves a number of institutions.1 5
In the late 1980's, Kuwait Municipality realized the magni-
tude of the land vacancy crisis and its impacts and enhanced the
role of an in-house committee responsible for guiding developments
in Kuwait Town and advising on future plans."
Some recent projects and studies* demonstrate the realiza-
tion of the city center's need for identification and character. In fact,
these projects do not deal with the principal issues and the broad
framework of the problem; they do not address the real problem in
a comprehensive manner. Borrowing styles, using superficially what
is called Islamic architecture, recreating history, and reviving the
past are ineffective attempts to add distinctive traits and special
marks to the image of the city.
"The Greening of Kuwait," the competition for developing
Abdullah Al-Ahmed Street, the restoration of Souq Al-Amir, the
Kuwait Historical Preservation Study, and the re-creation of the
miniature Kuwait village on the seaside.
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Chapter 2: The Context
Description of Kuwait City
The extent of the land vacancy situation and its adverse effect
on the life of the city cannot be understood without the acknowl-
edgment and appreciation of the contextual factors involved. The
bare, sandy, empty lots are even more unbearable with the heat and
sandstorms, and the glare on an expansive open space is formidable.
The problem of land vacancy in the city center of Kuwait should not
be seen as separate from its physical, natural, social and political
context.
The present center of Kuwait City, is surrounded by low-
density, self-contained residential neighborhoods created by the
intersection of the radial and ring roads system [Fig. 21]. These
villa-type single-family residential blocks are located in islands and
are isolated by major roads and expressways edged by wide
unpaved setbacks [Fig. 22]. Each of these neighborhoods has a
center that contains a co-op supermarket, shops for daily shopping,
a clinic, a post office, and other municipal and public services
depending on the size and location of each neighborhood. The city
has been expanding towards the south and it has reached the sixth
ring road so far. Some of these neighborhoods are strictly for
Kuwaitis; others where non-Kuwaitis live are mainly higher density
multi-family apartment buildings. Whereas about 90% of Kuwaitis
live in villas, 95% of non-Kuwaitis live in apartments [Fig. 23,24].
Some of the non-Kuwaiti neighborhoods are located in the
secondary commercial and retail centers that cater to various needs
[Fig. 21] Kuwait; Urban Pattern. Aerial photograph 1990
Source: Spot Image Corp.
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[Fig. 231 Villa in a Kuwaiti neighborhood
[Fig. 22] Expressway isolating
residential neighborhoods
Source: Ministry of Information,
Kuwait: Facts and Figures, 1988
Higher Income
Lower Income
[Fig. 241 Apartment Buildings for non-Kuwaiti
and shopping requirements depending on the levels of income,
tastes and preferences of the different ethnic groups [Fig. 25].
Although the city has a bus system which is mainly used by
expatriate labor, the majority of the city inhabitants use their cars
for commuting within the city. Kuwaitis, specifically, are adamant
about using their cars rather than public transportation; cars are a
direct symbol of their oil-related affluence, power and social status.
As a result of the decentralization and the extension of roads, a
significant amount of time is spent travelling from one place to
another, causing traffic congestion especially on the radial and ring
roads.
In the late 1980's, the waterfront of the city was developed
into a major recreational development that has restaurants, marine
clubs, marinas, and promenades. The waterfront, commercial
activities in Salmiyeh (a fashionable, up-scale sub-center), other retail
centers, shopping malls, hotels and restaurants constitute the major
entertainment activities in the city. Some of the government
institutions, ministries, hospitals, the university, and other public
services are mainly located either west or south of the city center.
However, the city has some attractive physical features and assets--
the coastline and the bay, Kuwait Towers, the contrast of sea and
desert, and the central location of Kuwait Town--which constitute
the present image of the city. If utilized productively, these features
will improve the urban quality of the city and enhance its image
and character.
In spite of the dispersed commercial, retail, and entertainment
activities as well as other public services within the city, up until the
Iraqi invasion the city center in Kuwait had maintained its vitality
and crowdedness. The private service sector is the second largest
Salmiya Sub-Center
(Non-Kuwaiti)Shuweikh Industrial &
Whole Sale
[Fig. 251 Map showing new residential neighborhoods, road network, and
secondary commercial centers
Source: Jonathan Crusoe and David Kemp, MEED Profile No.6, Kuwait:
rebuilding a country, London 1991
employer (after the government) in Kuwait. The center still had
special retail shopping in the Souq, with wares such as gold and
jewelry, fabrics, carpets, spices, essences, incense, and traditional
Kuwaiti garments. The new shopping malls differ in the quality of
their shops and merchandise. As a matter of fact, Kuwait City used
to be a major shopping center for the Gulf region, not only for
Kuwait's residents but also for surrounding countries. Shopping in
Kuwait, especially in climate-controlled shopping malls, is an
entertainment and social pastime; people (especially women) spend
considerable time in shopping areas, mostly in the afternoons and
early evenings. On weekends and holidays some parts of the center
become livelier and more congested. Hotels and restaurants cater
mainly to businessmen and foreigners. There is no doubt that the
Iraqi invasion and subsequent war left their marks on all these
activities and imposed different realities on all aspects of life in
Kuwait City.
Natural Environment
Kuwait has the typical arid climate and geography of the
desert that forms the Arabian Peninsula. The topography of the city
is mainly flat and the surrounding desert rises gently from the east
to the west. The desert in Kuwait does have some dunes and oases
but does not have the appeal, the soil texture or color of the
romanticized desert landscape; it becomes green only during the
short spring season when the Kuwaitis have the traditional spring
exodus to the desert.
The city in general has a hard landscape and very little
greenery because of the poor soil quality and water scarcity. The
maintenance and upkeep cost of greenery in Kuwait is high; so far
no serious effort has been made to encourage landscaping and
planting of the city as the government did in Abu Dhabi and Al-Ain
in the United Arab Emirates, where the personal vision of the ruler
* Usually in February, most Kuwaiti families spend two to three
weeks camping in the desert. It is the only time they can interact
intensely with their natural environment; they are willing to
commute to their jobs from tents in the desert in order to preserve
this tradition.
has had a tremendous impact on the quality of city urban
environment. The city, and specifically the center, lacks the lushness,
freshness, color and smell of greenery.
In summer, which lasts for about seven months, the heat of
the sun, the humidity and the sandstorms affect every aspect of the
city's daily life. For example, some construction work, especially the
pouring of concrete, has to be done at night. Life starts very early
in the morning (between 6 and 7 a.m.), with a break at noon for
siesta, which brings the city to a complete standstill before activity
resumes at four in the afternoon. Except for government offices,
people normally go back to work in the afternoon for about three
hours, and generally do their shopping afterwards as shops stay
open late in the evenings. The split working day increases the traffic
congestion because of the doubled rush hours.
The climate not only affects the daily life of the city, but also
the architectural form of the city. People need to be protected from
heavy sandstorms, direct sun light and glare; shaded areas are
essential, not only for people, but for cars and other exposed objects
as the harsh climatic conditions affect everything in the city's
physical environment [Fig. 26]. The use of shading and air
circulating devices are necessary; unprotected open spaces are rarely
used during the day. Heat, glare, and the continuous brutal
duststorms and strong wind limit outdoor life, especially during
daytime in the hot months of the summer. In winter, the
temperature may drop drastically at night, whereas daytime
weather is pleasant and comfortable, allowing for substantial
outdoor recreation.
[Fig. 26] Photographs showing
the need for shade in Kuwait
Social Context
Up until August of 1990, Kuwait's population was about 2.17
million,' out of which only 27.5% were native Kuwaitis; the
government's goal was to increase this percentage to 33% by the
year 2000.2 The rest of the population was mainly comprised of
expatriates from over one hundred nationalities who came to
Kuwait and intended to stay only temporarily, and on whom the
society depended. In Kuwait, foreigners are not allowed to be
naturalized or own property, regardless of the number of years they
have lived in Kuwait. Therefore, the social system has a duality of
structure due to the fact that expatriates never integrate with
Kuwaiti society. Non-Kuwaitis usually maintain ties with their
original societies and socialize mostly with their own people. Since
they have no continuity or future in Kuwait, their aspirations and
views are different from Kuwaitis, as are their concerns for and
attitudes towards the city. After the invasion, Kuwait's population
decreased to less than 1 million; as of late 1991 about 50% are
Kuwaitis. According to latest reports, 44.5% of Kuwaiti population
are less than 15 years old and 44.1% of population are between 15
and 44 years old.3  For non-Kuwaitis, percentages before the
invasion were 29.9% and 57.6% respectively.4 Also, Kuwait has the
second highest per capita income in the world. The government of
Kuwait is responsible for providing an extremely generous welfare
system. For example, Kuwaitis do not pay any form of taxes or fees
for services, and the government guarantees employment, housing,
free education and health services in addition to other privileges
and benefits. Therefore, Kuwaitis can afford to completely depend
on servants for their daily life requirements and have more leisure
time than people in other countries. Another manifestation of their
affluence is the high rate of car ownership; teenagers in particular
spend their leisure time driving.
The indigenous population of Kuwait is a tribal, traditional,
and exclusive Islamic society with great ambitions for modernity,
prosperity, and progress. The number of people in a typical Kuwaiti
household is fairly large; having and bringing up a large number of
children is not an economic problem for Kuwaitis. One of
government's main goals is to increase the Kuwaiti population and
people have no difficulty getting help raising their children. Kuwaiti
families maintain strong relationships and ties with their extended
families and relatives; they have also maintained their social
traditions and Islamic values.
Kuwaitis strongly adhere to their religion and any form of
activity that contradicts Islamic values such as gambling, alcohol
drinking, or women swimming at public beaches is prohibited.
Public entertainment is limited; for Kuwaitis, social gatherings are
the dominant pastime during weekdays. Women often go shopping
for leisure, and men go to diwaniyas to socialize, do business, talk
politics, exchange information, eat dinner and drink tea and coffee.
Kuwaitis have recently started to enjoy family entertainment like
taking children to the waterfront, entertainment parks, or local
restaurants. Before the invasion, Kuwaitis who had weekend houses
on the beach would spend Thursdays and Fridays at the seashore.
Lower and middle income Kuwaitis generally spend their free time
and holidays either sitting or having picnics at the seaside and
waterfront. The sea and its related diversions are the main attraction
for both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis; to their dismay, the newly
constructed waterfront project physically obstructs people's
[Fig. 27] Photographs showing the need for physical interaction with water
interaction with the water [Fig. 27]. In general, cultural,
entertainment, and leisure activities are few; the younger generation
and cultured, sophisticated people are the ones who suffered most
from this limitation [Fig. 28].
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[Fig. 281 Photographs showing the need for greenery
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Postwar Realities
Up until August, 1990, the socio-economic context described
was still valid (since the invasion, further field research has been
restricted). The Iraqi invasion and the Gulf War imposed important
new economic, political, and social realities and changed the
contextual factors. National and internal security has become an
increased concern in Kuwait; the government has had to reexamine
its policies. The general postwar policy of the government is to
decrease the non-Kuwaiti population and to reach a balance
between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis (the target total population is
1.2 million).5 Additional policies include more dependence on
natives and less reliance on foreign labor (76% of labor force before
invasion), a higher dependence on technology, and training and
education of Kuwaitis. 7 The government has been discouraging
expatriates from bringing their families to live in Kuwait. Postwar
policies regarding the decrease of population will certainly have
adverse economic impacts; the policies will reduce the need for the
service sector, and decrease the demand for development. The
government as the principal spender will have several years of
deficit to come, and so far the private sector's confidence in the
economy has been undermined.' The government is considering
some kind of nominal charges for public services and some form of
taxes on foreign businesses. Regardless of changes in the social,
economic, and political contexts, the fact remains that the center has
an issue of land vacancy and that an effort needs to be made to deal
with it.
Land vacancy in the center of Kuwait City should not be
separated from its contextual factors. It is not only the question of
how to deal with the problem and what to do with the empty land
in the center. The broader question is how to deal with land
vacancy in a city center where land prices have reached unprece-
dented astronomical levels and in a country that enjoys one of the
highest per capita income, highest population growth, and highest
rate of car ownership. Moreover, a solution is required for
developing vacant land in one of the hottest regions in the world,
where water is scarce and soil quality is poor. Finally, there are the
questions of whether there will be sufficient demand for
development in the center in light of recent depopulation policies
and whether it is justifiable and feasible to develop a physically
empty city center that has retained its vital activity considering the
large number of vacant rented housing units resulting from the
recent departure of expatriates.
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Part Two: The Past
What Went Wrong?
In order to understand and be able to analyze the factors that
led to the present state of the center, it is essential to retrace and
carefully examine the historical events and factors that lead to the
phenomenon of vacancy in the inner part of the city. The vacant
land in Kuwait's city center is a result of more than one factor; the
origins of some of these factors go back to the pre-oil era, such as
changes in the public attitudes and collective memory as well as the
influences of the private sector and the British.
It is extremely difficult to understand why the city center
took its present form without the knowledge of the historical
context. The international events and regional political changes
greatly influenced the evolutionary process of its physical develop-
ment. In Kuwait, the government's policies and planning decisions
have been driven primarily by outside forces and abrupt economic
and political changes.
Chapter 3 will discuss some pre-oil historical issues that led
to land vacancy in the center; there will be an attempt to describe
the traditional city and its dense fabric, urban form, and the special
character that responded to the surrounding desert environment. In
Chapter 4 there will be an analysis of post-oil planning efforts and
a summary of the Master Plans, reviews, and studies that have been
carried out so far. The milestones of the last forty years which had
a direct impact by either prompting or delaying decisions, will be
included to achieve a fuller comprehension and a better analysis.
Chapter 5 will define, analyze, and elaborate on the causes of and
participants in the problem. Identifying and taking these factors into
account will enable decision makers and planners to approach
future plans and programs with more insight in order to ensure a
realistic and satisfactory implementation.
Kuwait Town, The Traditional City
Source: Hamid Shuaib
Chapter 3: Early Development of Kuwait Town
Historical Background
Until the late eighteenth century, Kuwait was an obscure
fishing village and trading town on the Arabian Gulf under the
control of the Beni Khalid tribes. It did not contribute to the major
patterns of trade in the region, namely the one from Basrah in
southern Iraq to India. At that time, the Utub, a branch of the E'neza
tribal confederations, migrated from Nejid in the north eastern parts
of the Arabian Peninsula because of droughts and scarcity of natural
resources as well as hostilities from other tribes. The Utub managed
to take over and declare independence from Beni Khalid in 1756.
In 1760, the Utub were split and the Al-Khalifa branch
migrated to Bahrain while the Al-Sabah branch remained in Kuwait
and established their power and the legacy of their uninterrupted
and prevailing rule in the Emirate of Kuwait.
In 1776, The East India Company established a base in the
Gulf, signaling the development of British interest in the region for
commercial and political control purposes.' After the Persian
occupation of Basrah, the East India Company started to send its
mail from India to Aleppo through Kuwait using camel cargo,
calling it the "Desert Express."2  Kuwait began to acquire its
commercial importance as a terminus for trade from Syria and the
Levant and as a port on the Gulf. For the next century, the British
and Ottoman relations in Kuwait were strained.
The political developments of the late century--the British
occupation of Egypt, the Russian interest in reaching the warm
waters of the Gulf, and the Ottoman encouragement and assistance
to the Germans in building the Berlin-Baghdad railway with plans
to extend it into Kuwait-urged the British to sign a mutual benefits
agreement with Sheikh Mubarak in 1899, whereby Kuwait received
protection from Ottoman invasion and protection of its shipping
and pearl-diving fleet. In return, Britain acquired access to the north
of the Gulf at the borders of the Ottoman Empire in Iraq.
In 1902, the first British political agent was appointed. In
1914, Britain agreed to sign an agreement which stated that Kuwait
was to be an independent government under British protection.3
Through their Political Agent and advisors in Kuwait, the British
exerted direct and indirect influence on political and administrative
decisions. Their influence was not limited to the advisory role, it
extended to the institutions and administrative system as well.
When the time came and Kuwait needed planners, the British were
available and the obvious choice for continued modernization. At
that time, Kuwait's port gained importance in competition with
Basrah in Iraq. European distribution agencies began to relocate
from Basrah to Kuwait.
By 1934, an agreement was signed between Kuwait and the
Anglo American Oil Company in which Sheikh Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-
Sabah stipulated that no exploration or drilling would take place
inside the city wall. In 1938, oil was discovered in the Burgan oil
field (at the time the largest oil field in the world), but its exploita-
tion was delayed by the Second World War.' Oil production began
in 1946.5 This was the turning point in Kuwait's history: it trans-
formed Kuwait from a small state with an insignificant city and port
into one of the wealthiest oil-producing countries.
Physical Development of Traditional City
The earliest settlement was located on an elevated site for
two reasons: easy defense and surrounding water wells outside the
wall in Hawali and Shamiya. The first wall was built in 1760 to
protect the town from Bedouin raids. The wall formed a crescent
following the edge of the existing settlement and topography, it was
750 meters long and had five gates. According to historians, the
town's population at that time was 10,000 and its area was about
11.275 Hectares.' [Fig. 29]
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[Fig. 29] The walls and gates of the old town
Source: Kuwait Municipality, Planning and Urban Development in
Kuwait, Kuwait, 1980
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[Fig. 30] Major activities in Kuwait Town
During the nineteenth century, as a result of the growing
trading activities, the obscure village grew organically and trans-
formed into an integrated city in which residential neighborhoods,
retail and commercial activities were the major elements. The two
major economic activities (sea-related economic activities and desert
trading) were developed along two axes. In 1811, as the town
expanded, the second wall was built parallel to the first wall: it was
2300 meters long and had seven gates. The town area was about
72.4 Hectares.7 Prominent sea merchant families built their houses
along the sea axis and the harbor (the sea port) in the Seif area and
the commercial activities were concentrated along the desert route
axis, with a custom's house at Shamiya gate (the land port).* [Fig.
30] Safat Square was the center of trading activity; it was the desert
caravans' terminal, a meeting place, and a focal point for social and
economic interaction. During this early period, the Sief Palace was
built on the seafront; it was and is the heart of the city center
[Fig. 31].
[Fig. 31] The Sief Palace
Source: Saba Shiber, Arab City Growth, Kuwait, 1967
In the early twentieth century, when sea trading, pearl-
diving, and shipbuilding activities were thriving, the town of
Kuwait expanded. In 1921, the Saudis advanced on and attempted
to besiege Kuwait, and a third wall was built to protect the
* Some gates are named for a destination and/or purpose. Sham
is Arabic for Damascus. Therefore Shamiya refers to the direction of
Damascus and also implies the desert route between Damascus and
Kuwait Town.
expanded Kuwait Town and its inhabitants. The third wall followed
the form of the second wall; it was 6400 meters long and had five
gates. The town's area was about 750 Hectares.' The city inside this
last wall represents the present city center. The form of the early
settlement and the first wall dictated the form of the expanded city
and following city walls, and therefore defined the form of the
current city center and the city's road network. The concentric ring
roads parallelled the form of the last wall and radial roads extended
from gates' axes.
[Fig. 321 Narrow street in the
traditional city
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi,
Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait, 1987
[Fig. 331 Protected and Shaded
Alleyway
Source: Ronald Lewcock & Zahra
Freeth, Traditional Architecture
in Kuwait and the Northern Gulf,
London, 1978
The old settlement developed along narrow pedestrian
streets. The outside walls of old one storey courtyard houses had
plain facades with minimal openings and ornamentation. The old
fabric of Kuwait Town was densely knit to suit natural, social, and
economic conditions. For example, high walls along both sides of
narrow streets protected pedestrians from heat and severe dust
storms; side walls of houses were not directly exposed to the heat
of the sun, as houses were built adjacent to one another [Fig 32,33].
High, plain walls also provided privacy and separation of family life
from street life. The architecture of the traditional city was sympa-
thetic to the climate, culture, and desert environment, and also gave
the city its unique character and identity. The silhouette formed by
minarets and wind catchers, and the surrounding wall, contributed
to the city's Arabic and Islamic image and character [Fig 34,35].
[Fig. 341 The traditional city
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi, Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait 1987
[Fig. 351 The dense fabric of the traditional city
Source: Kuwait Municipality: Historical Preservation Study; Old Kuwait
Town, Kuwait, 1988
Economic Development
The economic endeavors in Kuwait Town revolved around
sea and desert trading. Economic activities related to the sea such
as pearl-diving, trading, shipbuilding, and fishing were the main
sources of income. During the nineteenth century, trade flourished
as local pearl merchants realized that it was more profitable for
them to market their pearls directly in India (rather than sell to
middlemen in Kuwait). The Kuwaitis sailed to India to sell pearls;
on the return journey they brought rice and spices,timber from East
Africa, and wheat and dates from Basrah.
El U..
[Fig. 361 Sief harbor
Source: Hamid Shuaib
[Fig. 371 Intense seafront activities
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi, Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait, 1987
The timber trade and availability established the industry of
dhow [large sail boats] building in Kuwait. The dhow industry
flourished in all sizes of ships, from the large oceangoing dhows to
pearl-diving dhows, small fishing boats, and all related handicrafts.
The prominent merchant families living along the seafront, together
with all other sea-related activities and the harbor, constituted the
lively part of the city. The busy dhow harbor (in the Sief area) was
adjacent to warehouses and the Souq [Fig. 36,37].
[Fig. 38] Safat Square
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi, Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait, 1987
The other economic activity was desert trading; Bedouins
used to bring their goods and sell them inside the wall. The
Bedouins occupied the inland parts because of their connections
with the desert. Both sea and desert commercial activities were
linked at Safat Square [Fig. 38]. During his visit in 1912, Raunkiaer
observed:
On the inland side there was a moveable town, that is to
say of caravaneers and bedouin, scattered over parts of the
desert which penetrates like an arm of the sea into the real
Kuwait ... In the innermost corner of the inlet of wastes
begins the bazaar, with numerous lanes and partly covered
streets.9
[Fig. 391 The desert route
Source: Hamid Shuaib
By 1930, pearl-diving and the pearl trade had started to
decline due to the competition from Japanese cultured pearls,
coupled with the worldwide economic recession which effected the
whole region.'" Kuwait's local economy suffered from a recession
which did not last long; oil was discovered in 1938 and a new era
began in Kuwait's economic history.
From the beginning, the old merchant families shared the
fortunes and hardships with the ruling family. They depended on
each other; subsequently, a social contract was instituted between
the ruling family and the old Kuwaiti merchant families. Their
mutual relationship was one of respect, support and interde-
pendence.
The old merchant families established their names and
prominence through their trading and by acting as local representa-
tives for European agencies. Through the use of their diwaniyas as
guest houses for agencies' representatives, old families initiated their
relationships with these agencies. Also, educated Kuwaitis who
could translate and provide business support were able to become
local agents for the European companies. The government and the
ruling family depended on the merchant families for their political
support, advisory role, and revenue. Merchant families used to pay
taxes (2%) and customs to the government at both the seaport and
the desert port.
After the oil discovery, when the government no longer
needed this financial support, the ruling family and government
chose to reciprocate and acknowledge the role of these families (and
later other newly established prominent families). The government's
gestures of respect and support continued and increased over time
until there reached a point where the government became quite
vulnerable to pressure and abuse, especially in land registration,
land acquisition, and plan implementation.
Kuwait Municipality is the only institution responsible for the
planning and development of the city; it represents the state of
Kuwait as a land owner (the Municipality is directly attached to the
Council of Ministers). Since its establishment in 1934, Kuwait
Municipality has been responsible for all land transactions, land
development, and physical planning of Kuwait at a national, metro-
politan, and city center level. Through the jurisdiction and power of
the Municipal Council, the Municipality played a major role in land
registration, ownership, valuation, acquisition, distribution, and
ownership conflicts." The Municipality's jurisdictions are spread
from the National Physical Planning Policy down to the street
furniture, and include planning, programming, execution, and
maintenance.
The Municipal Council consists of appointed and elected
members and the president (appointed by the ruler). In the past, it
was important that the president also be a member of the ruling
family. The president and members of the Municipal Council have
to be reputable and highly respected people in the city. The Council
is supposed to represent the public, but in reality it has represented
the influential private sector. Membership on the Municipal Council
is not only a prestigious position, but also a very powerful and
effective one. Through its decisions and actions, the Municipal
Council can manipulate, pressure, and direct decisions regarding the
development of the city.
The phenomenon of land vacancy has some attributes that go
back to the origin of land ownership. In Kuwait City, prior to oil
discovery and exploitation, the land that later became so valuable
and expensive to develop did not have much value. It was not
useful as agricultural land; therefore, there were minimal disputes
about ownership, water, or grazing. Financial resources were
limited; nobody had the foresight for future development or land
speculation. Except for those owned by wealthy and prominent
families, parcels inside the wall varied in size and were of small
area and irregular shape. Outside the city wall, and up to the late
1940's, the desert land did not have any value. According to Shari'a
[Islamic laws], the prevailing law at that time, public land was
owned by the ruler; only the Calif [ruler in early Islam] or the Sultan
[Ottoman ruler] had the power to donate land, and to whom he
chose."
In the early days, land came into possession in three ways:
by purchasing or seizing the land, or by ruler's donation to favored
individuals. Before the Municipality's establishment in 1934, there
was no official land or property registration. After that, the
Municipality became the responsible entity for buying and selling
land and properties in its capacity as land owner representing the
state. By 1940, the Registration Department was established and
people started to petition for land registration after proving their
claims.
The flow of oil income in 1946 triggered some unplanned
development, characterized by "cutting" new roads in the organic
fabric of the old city and widening existing lanes to serve the
growing number of automobiles. There was a fierce opposition to
the new roads, which demolished homes and disrupted the existing
social and neighborhood relationships. It is significant to note that
the Kuwaitis used an Arabic term meaning "to cut a road" for the
process of road widening. They even refer to this period as "the
year of the cut" with all its implications of physical and emotional
separation. This process signaled the start of the destruction of the
traditional organic fabric of the town of Kuwait.
The Municipality had to expropriate land for this purpose; a
parcel or part of a parcel was expropriated for street encroachment
with minimal or no compensation. At that time, land expropriation
and land acquisition were unwelcome practices to the town's
inhabitants. As the oil wealth increased, the government represented
by the Municipality became more generous in land acquisition for
public projects [Fig. 401.
[Fig. 40] New roads in the old town
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi, Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait, 1987
Hamid Shuaib
The early 1950's witnessed a milestone in the history of
Kuwait: Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem, who was the Amir of Kuwait
between 1950 and 1965, declared that the oil wealth in Kuwait
belonged to the Kuwaiti citizens and not to the ruling clan (as it is
in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates). His visions
of modernity and democracy were translated into a distribution of
oil wealth among all Kuwaitis, the establishment of a constitution,
ambitious development programs, and a generous welfare system.
As a result, the government adopted some major public policies to
implement these decisions such as a high valuation for property
acquisition for those who owned houses, a provision of government
employment for those who did not own property, and an upgraded
standard of living for all Kuwaitis. As a tool for distributing the oil
money and encouraging private development, the government
began to acquire land for public projects from property owners in
the traditional city, paying extremely inflated prices. The Municipal-
ity representing the government began to purchase land in excess
of what was required for public projects and re-sell the surplus back
to the public (mostly to the original owners) for a fraction of its cost
to the government (about 4%)" after taking what it needed for
building new roads and replanning the lots. The government's goal
at that time was to benefit the largest number of people, to
encourage them to build new houses, generate income from
developing what remained from their properties, or establish
businesses.
In this process, the government not only created a demand
for land, but also created a high value for land in the city within the
wall. Land became a source for accumulating wealth, therefore,
people rushed to benefit from the opportunity, claiming land
especially outside the city wall. When oil was discovered, the
government had to delineate and reserve public land for oil
exploration and production. To prevent land grabbing, people were
forced to register land (to which they had proof of prior claim).
Large tracts of worthless desert land outside the wall and unregis-
tered parcels inside the wall were seized by those who had either
the foresight or foreknowledge to anticipate future public projects."
At this point, the government had to limit the distance within which
people could claim lots by demarcating an area along the coast and
outside the city wall. During this transitional period, there was a
manipulation in land claims and registration with the help of some
Municipality employees. When land prices went up later they put
pressure on the Municipality either to acquire it or subdivide it and
extend infrastructure so they could sell it at high prices as residen-
tial lots.
The Collective Memory
The history of Kuwait Town before the oil prosperity is one
of hardship, depression, backwardness, and underdevelopment
because of limited resources, water scarcity, and an extremely harsh
natural environment. Life was full of uncertainties; favorable
conditions would include good rainfall, a fair sailing wind, and high
trading profits. The inhabitants of the traditional city lived a much
simpler life; extended family lived together in one house and social
life was limited to immediate family, relatives, and neighborhood
relationships. At that time, Kuwaitis could neither spend lavishly on
their houses and lifestyle, nor on public infrastructure. Houses were
built with mud brick and soft materials. Their life revolved around
the sea and its related activities.
Kuwaitis shared this memory of hardship--long trade
journeys to India and Africa, difficult conditions of pearl-diving,
and women staying alone with their children. The Kuwaitis also
shared the memory of traditions such as celebrating the returns of
dhows to Kuwait Town," finding the dana [rare large pearl], or the
close neighborhood relationships that accompanied their mutual
difficulties. It is this same collective memory of suffering which
[Fig. 41] Elements of the collective memory of the traditional city
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi, Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait, 1987
Source: Ronald Lewcock and Zahra Freeth, Traditional Architecture in
Kuwait and the Norther Gulf, London, 1978
Kuwaitis wanted to leave behind when they had the opportunity to
do so. Although they did not develop the city center, they managed
to destroy the traditional city. Kuwaitis became selective in their
memory; they wanted to eradicate the physical form that reminded
them of the part of their past associated with difficulties and
maintain the memories associated with the old traditions and social
relationships which are still vivid and active. Kuwaitis of the tradi-
tional city still have an attachment to their old city. Mubarakiya (the
old Souq) still has a special meaning and value. The vacant land in
the city center infers the destruction of these memories, values, and
heritage.
Kuwait Town Waterfront
Source: Hamid Shuaib
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Chapter 4: Plans, Reviews, and Studies
General Overview
Between 1950 and the present, the Gulf region has been
undergoing explosive political, economic, and social changes. In a
small, newly independent state like Kuwait, the national economy
and government policies are very sensitive to international and
regional events. Oil prices in a single commodity economy like
Kuwait directly and indirectly affect development programs, the
land market, and hence government actions. Chaotic situations
resulting from external changes prompted the government to
embark on many studies and plans and to call in foreign expertise.
Increases in oil prices were generally followed by prosperity, an
increase of government expenditure on development, and projects
which have required more expatriate labor. Thus, oil booms have
been followed by rapid population growth, greater demand on
development, inflated land prices, and higher rates of car owner-
ship.
International political and economic milestones, paralleled by
local responses such as government policies and actions, planning
efforts and plan implementation, and private sector pressure and
influence have had impacts on the city center's development. These
forces resulted in decentralization, destruction of the traditional city,
unfeasibility of land development as well as high public land
ownership, numerous projects and studies, and failure of plan
implementation.
It would be extremely difficult to describe and analyze the
planning process without an understanding of its context and
background. Since this period of time was full of dramatic events
and dynamic changes, the analysis in this chapter will be limited
only to the major events that influenced the physical evolvement of
the center and how the government, private sector, and land market
responded. Following is a brief analysis of the Master Plans, their
reviews, and a partial listing of studies and projects that took place.
The First Master Plan
The temporary interruption of the Iranian oil supply during
the Mussadiq crisis in Iran 1951 further increased the importance of
Kuwait's oil for the west.' In the early 1950's, Kuwait's new
prosperity created a demand for services, which attracted expatriate
labor and professionals. The creation of Israel in 1948 accelerated the
Palestinian exodus to Arab countries, and a high percentage went
to Kuwait. When Kuwait took its first census in 1957, the population
was 206,000.
In order to implement the government's ambitions of
modernization and improving the standard of living, the Develop-
ment Board was established in 1951. Headed by the Amir, the board
was the highest authority for planning and construction. The Board
decided to employ a British firm to develop a physical plan for
Kuwait Town. Minoporio, Spencely and Macfarlane of Britain were
assigned the preparation of the first Master Plan of Kuwait Town.
At the time the British were considered the most advanced city
planners.
During this period, there was a debate about the future city
center and a major decision had to be made to choose between three
options presented by the Master Plan consultants: the first was to
keep the old city and build a new center outside the wall; the
second was to rebuild the existing city center and develop new
residential neighborhoods outside the city wall, maintaining Kuwait
Town as the state capital and preserving its functions as the city
center; the third and most radical option was to build a new city
along the coast, south of Kuwait Town. The decision was to adopt
the second option. At the time the consultant did not have any prior
knowledge of the place except that Kuwaitis wanted a modern city.
Minoporio thought there were no artifacts worth saving in Kuwait
Town (as compared to landmarks in Isfahan and Baghdad).2
Meanwhile, the ever increasing number of cars and limousines
could not get through the city wall's gates [Fig. 42]. In 1954, a
decision was made to demolish the city wall, leaving only the gates,
and to create an open space following the wall's shape in its
memory3 [Fig. 43]. The space between the Sief area (the palace and
the harbor) and the open space would then be used for government
and commercial structures. The wall's demolition encouraged the
further demolition of a large number of houses in Kuwait Town.
The 1952 Master Plan's main objectives were the creation of
a beautiful and dignified town center, provision of a modern road
system, commercial and industrial zoning, residential zoning inside
and outside the wall, selection of sites for public parks and open
spaces, and planting of trees along principal boulevards and at
important points.4 The plan established a network of ring roads
paralleling the wall and radial roads extending through the gates
[Fig. 42] The traffic congestion at wall gates
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi, Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait, 1987
Source: Sulaiman Al-Awadi, Kuwait Al-Madhi, Kuwait, 1987
[Fig. 431 Demolition of city wall, remaining gates today
and beyond the wall. The intersections created by these networks
outlined the self-supporting residential areas outside the wall
[Fig. 44, 45].
The Shiekh not only accepted this plan, he also approved the
demolition of houses in the traditional city. The increase in land
value resulting from both the large acquisition compensations and
development plans made land acquisition desirable and accelerated
the exodus of residents from the center. People exerted enormous
pressure on the government to acquire their properties inside the
wall so they could move to the newly created residential neighbor-
hoods. Encouraged by the government, the public's attitude at the
time was to embrace modernity and reject the poverty and back-
wardness of the past.
The 1952 Master Plan initiated and encouraged decentral-
ization; large traditional city households (20-25 extended family
members) were separated into three to four smaller households as
each new household was recognized as a single family unit.
Political and Social Changes
During the 1950's, the region witnessed some major changes
in its political structure. The Egyptian revolution in 1952, the Suez
War in 1956, the Iraqi revolution in 1958, and the rising tide of Arab
Nationalism culminated in the sixties.6 These factors led Sheikh
Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah to demand independence negotiations
with Britain. Eventually, in 1961, Kuwait became an independent
state. The strong Arab Nationalism movement and the other
* There is a summary of the 1952 Master Plan in Appendix A.
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[Fig. 44] 1952 Kuwait City Master Plan
Source: Minoprio & Spencely
Kuwait; Kuwait, 1951
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[Fig. 45] 1952 City center Master Plan
Source: Kuwait Municipality, Planning and Urban Development in
Kuwait, Kuwait, 1980
political changes left their imprint on the Kuwaiti social and
political life.
The social changes of the fifties incorporated rejection of the
past and westernization. Living outside the city wall in a single-
family detached unit became socially desirable, and living in a small
traditional courtyard house in the center became unfashionable.
Furthermore, some people replaced their traditional dress with a
western style to demonstrate their modernization. During this
period, the pace of destruction of the traditional city was faster than
it had ever been. For lack of strong local institutions of higher
learning, many Kuwaitis were educated in Egypt and Iraq during
this period. Arab professionals, Palestinians and Egyptians, together
with newly graduated Kuwaitis, played a major role in shaping the
legal and educational systems in Kuwait. Additionally, Arab
planners and architects were employed in different planning and
architectural projects both in the public and private sectors; they
had a tremendous influence on the early planning and architectural
decisions for the city.
Following Kuwait's independence, General Qassim of Iraq
declared Kuwait to be part of Iraq. The British intervened and the
crises was resolved, and to increase the population, the Kuwaiti
government adopted a new policy for Naturalization and Immigra-
tion, whereby labor migration to Kuwait was encouraged and the
Bedouins were naturalized. The increased migration of expatriates
and professionals to Kuwait and the naturalization policy caused an
abnormal population growth during this period and drastically
changed the demographic composition of the country; by 1965 the
population had jumped to 467,339.7 The population growth
exceeded the capacity of the planned areas.
[Fig. 461 Parking problem in Safat Square, 1960
Source: Hamid Shuaib
[Fig. 47] New road; placing existing mosque in roundabout
Source: Saba Shiber, The Kuwait Urbanization, Kuwait, 1964
During the 1960's, the government was under continued
pressure to acquire more properties within the center. The increas-
ing problems of the city center, such as traffic congestion, car
parking, and chaotic architectural styles, added to the pressure on
the government and planning officials. The reactionary government
policies were simply a quick response to immediate and urgent
situations. International experts and consultants were called upon
each time government faced a crises.
After gaining independence in 1961, several boards and
committees were established. The Valuation Committee was
established in 1961 to deal with the increased pressure for land
acquisition in the center. The Planning Board was established in
1963 and the Planning Department was transferred from the
Ministry of Public Works to Kuwait Municipality.
Shortcomings of the Master Plan
The early 1960's witnessed a chaotic situation resulting from
the land acquisition, inflated land market, frantic land transactions,
public projects, addition of new residential neighborhoods, and most
important, technical and administrative problems. The manifestation
of this disorder in the center was evident in the wasted land, wide
setbacks, under-utilized spaces between buildings, number of
roundabouts, traffic congestion, lack of parking areas, and the
diverse uncoordinated architectural expressions ' [Fig. 46,47].
Additionally, all parcels in the center were zoned for five storey
structures according to the first Master Plan. Dr. Saba George
Shiber, the architectural and city planning advisor to the govern-
ment of Kuwait, recommended the adoption of a contemporary
[Fig. 481 The CBD Plan
Source: Saba Shiber, The Kuwait Urbanization, Kuwait, 1964
[Fig. 49] Demolition for implementing CBD Plan
Source: Saba Shiber, The Kuwait Urbanization, Kuwait, 1964
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comprehensive and rational plan for the CBD (Central Business
District) of Kuwait City 9 [Fig. 48], which initially comprised of the
replanning of eight (later increased to eleven) blocks or parts
constituting the center.10 The process of planning the CBD blocks
included the following steps by the government: land expropriation,
large-scale land assembly, demolition of old structures, planning
infrastructure, production of design guidelines, reallocation or sale
to the public by auction.
In 1962, a freeze on both the 1952 Master Plan and develop-
ment was enforced." The CBD plan was implemented only in four
areas because of time, cost, and difficulty in implementation.
Further, the CBD plan was an outdated system that took into
account neither demands for parking and other services nor
pedestrian movement and architectural cohesiveness within the
blocks " [Fig. 49].
The progression of land acquisition resulted in a sky-
rocketing land and property market because the government first
decreased land supply available in the market, and inflated the
market. Both the high land valuation and land market prices
influenced each other; land market values raised valuations and vice
versa. By the mid 1960's the government had to intervene to break
this vicious circle; the city was divided into three zones, each of
which had a maximum and a minimum land price to which the
valuation committee were asked to adhere." As investment in
property became more profitable and rewarding, the influential
private sector, exploiting their connections in the Municipality and
Municipal Council, exerted pressure on the government to acquire
more land in excess of the government's need, and to pay a housing
allowance for government expatriate employees (rather than to
build housing for them). Moreover, real estate investors pressured
the government to rent commercial office buildings for government
offices rather than to build new ones.
The trend of employing international experts and consultants
to work on projects and studies began in the early 1960's. A
Canadian firm was chosen to design the Kuwait Town waterfront.
The plan envisioned Kuwait as a sea-oriented city, having as its
heart the Sief Palace, extending south, with a skyline declining
towards the sea. The consultant proposed that the waterfront be
cleared (relocating the harbor and vegetable market) and that only
the Sief Palace be maintained. Extensive planting and greenery
landscaping were proposed [Fig. 50]. The Kuwait Waterfront Study
was probably the first attempt to create a vision for the future city
center." Also, it was one of the earliest projects destined to be
shelved. Since then, several projects and studies were commissioned
for improving the urban environment in the center; very few were
implemented. The one project that is worth mentioning is the
conversion of the old cemetery to the present Municipal Park; it was
the first and only cemetery that the religious authorities permitted
to be converted into a park.
The city outside the wall grew rapidly toward the west and
south with little control over development, appearance, and urban
sprawl. Owners of large land holdings outside the wall exerted
pressure on Municipality to subdivide their lands without a
municipal plan. The Municipality resisted the pressure at the
beginning, but complied shortly after. Ironically, some of the houses
in the new residential areas were empty and for sale. By the late
1960's, a good part of the old town was demolished as a result of
new construction, the CBD Plan, and large-scale movement outside
the traditional city, and migrants started to occupy the old houses
that were left in the center [Fig. 51].
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[Fig. 501 Early vision for the Waterfront
Source: Project Planning Associates Ltd., Proposed Waterfront
development, City of Kuwait, 1961
[Fig. 511 Al-Yarmouk residential neighborhood plan, 1969
Source: Kuwait Atlas, Kuwait
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The government's dilemma in the 1960's was that it had to
pay for the inflated land acquisition in the city center in excess of
its need, while simultaneously providing resources for extending
roads and infrastructure in the newly subdivided residential
neighborhoods.15 Moreover, Kuwait, as a recently independent
state, had to prove itself and gain support nationally and interna-
tionally. All these financial commitments and public expenditure
drained the available resources and left the government alarmed
and panicked.
[Fig. 521 1967 Municipality Development Plan
Source: Kuwait Municipality, Planning and Urban Development in
Kuwait, Kuwait, 1980
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Attempts at Solution
As a result of the inflated land acquisition policy and the
ambitious development policy, the government's financial commit-
ment became a major issue. Kuwait sought advice from the U.N.
and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and
subsequently a team of eleven experts visited Kuwait and prepared
reports and recommendations regarding the control and manage-
ment of growth and development in different aspects.
In 1965, the Municipality acknowledged the problems of
urban sprawl, low density, extended infrastructure, and the
unrealistic land and property market and prepared the 1967
Municipality Development Plan [Fig 52]. It was an assembly plan
that added residential, commercial and industrial zones to the 1952
Master Plan. The Municipality Development Plan neither dealt with
demographic and detailed traffic studies nor city center develop-
ment problems.'' It was limited to the planning of forty residential
neighborhoods, provision of the 5th and 6th ring roads, extension
of radial roads, and the planning of Shuaiba, a port and industrial
town." This plan did not have a direct impact within the city
center; it intensified the problems of low density, urban sprawl, and
extension of roads and services outside the center, despite its
original objectives and goals. The more people moved out of the
center, the more empty houses and vacant land that were left inside
the center.
At the time, the government realized that a comprehensive
planning effort was required for both urban plans. As a result the
government requested further advice from the U.N., and a commit-
tee of three advisors was formed to make recommendations on the
management and control of the rapid development. The committee
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submitted a report suggesting the appointment of an international
consultant to establish a base for comprehensive planning and
development in the state of Kuwait to the end of the century. In
1968, Colin Buchanan and Partners, a British planning firm, was
commissioned to work on the second Master Plan; they had to
produce a comprehensive program for both-short and long-term
urban planning.
In 1970, Colin Buchanan and Partners began to produce
plans at the national, metropolitan, and urban level; more detailed
plans were produced in 1971, including a plan for Kuwait Town.
For the analytical purpose of this study, only the Master Plan for
Kuwait Town will be discussed * [Fig. 53].
[Fig. 531 The increased parking problems in the center, late 1960's
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners, The Plan for Kuwait Town and
Plan Implementation, 1971
The 1971 Master Plan is summarized in Appendix A.
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The 1971 Master Plan
The main objectives of 1971 Master Plan for Kuwait Town
were to retain Kuwait Town as the state capital and principal
administrative and commercial center, to project balanced employ-
ment and population compositions, to decide on required services
and their locations, and to identify three expansion areas for the
core (specialized government and commercial services). Additional-
ly, the plan proposed a system of road hierarchy, restricted
pedestrian areas, parking, and a comprehensive public transporta-
tion system. Although the plan addressed issues regarding imple-
mentation policies and improvement of the urban environment in
the center such as character, pedestrian movement, open spaces,
landscape, and greenery, the plan's main concerns were demograph-
ic figures, development density, and traffic capacity. Since then,
policy-makers have been committed to plan implementation.
Outside the city center, major elements of the National Physical Plan
were implemented such as the main highway network, new
residential areas, public utility and social services [Fig. 54,55].
Parallel to the Buchanan studies, four international architec-
tural firms were selected to design some important civic projects in
the center: Riema Pietella; Belgiojoso, Perusetti and Rogers; Peter
Smithson; and George Candilis. Of the four projects, only the Sief
Palace expansion and Ministries Complex were implemented.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the oil embargo resulted in
soaring oil prices. By 1973, oil prices quadrupled and the Middle
East oil boom began. Real estate and land markets were the first to
be affected by the sudden increase in oil prices and government
revenues. In Kuwait City, a capital market had been strongly devel-
oped;'" land owners and shareholders were making enormous
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[Fig. 54] 1970 Kuwait City Master Plan
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners, The Plan for Kuwait Town and
Plan Implementation, 1971
[Fig. 551 1970 City Center Master Plan
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners, The Plan for Kuwait Town and
Plan Implementation, 1971
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profit from speculation. Land prices increased 200% in two years.
The highest values were for land and properties in Mubarakiya; the
value of land decreased as distance from the Souq increased. During
this period, wealth accumulation became easier, and a new trading
class was created. The Kuwaiti's public taste evolved and higher
degrees of sophistication were reached due to affluency, education,
and exposure to other cultures and countries. Private sector
investors started to employ international architects to design their
new buildings, and the international consultants replaced the
preceding Arab consultants.
The early 1970's economic boom created an enormous
pressure for development, especially in the center. The 1971 Master
Plan was approved and put into action, but the high land prices
made the development of land in the center unfeasible. In 1976, the
private sector and land owners in the center put pressure on the
Municipality to increase FAR, to change land usage, and to exclude
the basement and mezzanine floors from the allowed FAR in the
Building Code. The changes in zoning disregarded the impacts on
traffic, car parking, and other services [Fig. 56].
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[Fig. 561 The city center (early 1970's): land ownership, land values
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners, The Plan for Kuwait Town and
Plan Implementation, 1971
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With the increased demand for parking garages in the early
1970's, the Municipality leased some of its land in the center (25
years at token annual rents) to the real estate share-holding
companies in order to build parking garages, and allowed them to
use 12.5% of the parking areas for commercial use. Once more, the
private sector succeeded in pushing this percentage to 25%. A
zoning variance was issued and the regulations were changed. The
incentives given by the government to provide more parking spaces
were used by the private sector to attract more cars to the center.
Despite the growing demand for development in the center,
a significant percentage of the center's area remained vacant. The
National Housing Authority (established in 1974) did not build any
of its housing projects in the center until later in the 1970's, and few
public buildings were built during this period. Both the inflated
land value and restricted zoning regulations in the center discour-
aged private development within the city center, while development
in other surrounding areas of the center flourished. The feasibility
of land development increased as the distance from the center
increased; for example, development in Salmiya was more profitable
than in the center, and in Fintas more profitable than in Salmiya.
KMPR1- the First Review
The abrupt changes in the national economy and social life
that took place between 1970 and 1977 resulted in unexpected
circumstances such as abnormal population growth, pressure for
development, an unrealistic land market, and amendment of the
Building Code. These factors made a review of the Master Plan
necessary. Kuwait Municipality appointed the British firm of
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[Fig. 57]1977 KMPR1, Kuwait City Plan
Source: Shankland Cox Partnership in association with SSH, 1977
[Fig. 581 1977 KMPRI, City Center Plan
Source: Shankland Cox Partnership in association with SSH, 1977
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Shankand Cox Partnership, in association with a local firm, to
undertake this review. The 1977 Kuwait Master Plan Review
(KMPR1)' had to reexamine the 1971 Master Plan's projected
employment and resident population figures according to the
modified development capacity and zoning in the city center. It also
questioned the economic vitality of these developments (if achieved)
and their environmental impacts, as well as the severe traffic that
would be generated by them.19 The KMPR1 recommendations
included setting new targets for population growth, restricting and
possibly reducing FAR, and defining locations for governmental,
commercial, and residential uses. Based on new population targets,
it proposed alternative road patterns and public transportation, and
estimated the number of parking spaces required. Similar to the
1971 Master Plan, the review addressed environmental issues
regarding conservation and special character areas, as well as major
open spaces and landscaping of the city center [Fig. 57,58].
KMPR1 further emphasized the decentralization and
extension of urban areas and encouraged low-density urban sprawl
by extending and increasing the capacity of the road network.
Although it promoted the provision of housing in the center, like
the first plan, the review did not respond to cultural and climatic
issues.
Except for construction of Arabian Gulf Road and some other
roads in the center, no major urban physical changes took place
after the Master Plan and its first review. It proposed neither a
mechanism for stimulating development in the center nor attractive
solutions for residential development. The 1971 Master Plan and its
review served to further increase values for parcels zoned for
* KMPR1 is summarized in Appendix A.
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[Fig. 59] The Stock Exchange, Architect: John Bonnington
[Fig. 60] Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science, Architect: TAC
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commercial use. While the city was expanding south along the
coastline and west towards the desert, the center was undergoing
a continuous process of emptying, culminated by the relocation of
the old Sief harbor north of the city.
Both the 1971 Master Plan and KMPR1 generated the need
for further detailed studies and proposals. They defined action areas
for improving urban life and creating a quality environment within
the city center. International consultants were commissioned to
work on a variety of urban projects and proposals, as well as
studies for improving traffic and car parking problems. Neverthe-
less, none of these projects reached the implementation stage.
The design of many individual public buildings were
commissioned during this period, such as the Parliament, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stock Exchange, the National Museum, and State
Mosque. The design of privately owned buildings and four National
Housing Authority high-rise housing complexes in the center were
commissioned to international consultants [Fig. 59,60].
The 1970's economic and development boom was followed
by the 1980's recession, which was caused by the collapse of oil
prices, the Iraq-Iran War, and the crash of Souk Al-Manakh [the
informal stock market] in 1982. Since financial activities and the
construction industry are entirely dependent on government
expenditure and oil prices, the government decided after consider-
able pressure to compensate the small investors (less than 2 million
KD, 1 KD=$3.5) for their losses by buying their stocks at pre-crash
prices, which resulted in the government and local banks acquiring
large amounts of stock in local privately owned companies that had
large holdings in the center. The government felt no urgency to
develop the center and the private sector was reluctant to invest
because of the recession.
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In the early 1980's, the government's main concern was how
to deal with the drain of its financial resources resulting from its
heavy commitments and decrease in revenues. Unofficially Kuwait
supported Iraq financially during the war with Iran, while at the
same time, the government had agreed to compensate small stock-
holders for their losses. The accumulated debts, resulting from land
acquisition in excess of need, were about 600 Million KD; a policy
of land exchange and substitution was subsequently adopted. The
policy in the 1980's was not to acquire land except for the purpose
of providing infrastructure and public works.
In response to its difficulties, the government had to take
certain actions to keep up with the problematic situation of the
1980's. Some of the publicly-owned land was put up for sale in
public auction at the beginning of the 1980's (before the stock
market crash) and when the prices reached their peak. This action
was strongly opposed in Parliament (similar to the 1970's, their
stance was that the government should not compete with the
private sector). Since the crash of 1982, land prices were in continu-
ous decline, especially with the dragging on of the Iraq-Iran War.
[Fig. 61] Proposed mono-rail in the center
Source: Kuwait Municipality, Planning and Urban Development in
Kuwait
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Further Reviews and Studies
In 1983, Colin Buchanan and Partners produced the second
review of the 1971 Master Plan (KMPR2).* The intent of this review
was to update the 1971 Master Plan and ensure that it continue to
fulfill its original purpose in the light of changing circumstances.
The two most important factors that the second review dealt with
were the prospect of continued employment growth and Building
Code alteration. It adopted new population targets, estimated floor
area requirements, established a growth strategy, and updated road
and traffic systems. Also, four special environmental areas, each
with a similar use and character, were selected for further compre-
hensive environmental design studies. KMPR2 suggested some
rigorous development control for implementing the Master Plan.
Unfortunately, no serious effort was made to carry out these
suggestion. Like the 1971 Master Plan and KMPR1, the 1983 review
was mainly concerned with population growth numbers and
projections, development density, and traffic capacity. It did not
suggest major conceptual design changes or a different approach for
dealing with the city center; its main concern was for the two new
towns north and south of Kuwait City that were proposed in the
1971 Master Plan [Fig. 62,63].
In the mid 1980's, after the assassination attempt on the
Amir's life, a number of old houses in the center which had been
occupied by expatriate labor were vacated and demolished. Since
then, security has become a concern in the center, where most of the
government buildings are located.
* KMPR2 is summarized in Appendix A.
115
Ad A
MAWI PLANQ W0 km
[Fig. 62] 1983 KMPR2, Kuwait City Master Plan
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners & OAP/KEB, Master Plan for
Kuwait: Second Review 1983, Vol. 1: Planning and Policy
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[Fig. 63] 1983 KMPR2, City Center Master Plan
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners & OAP/KEB, Master Plan for
Kuwait: Second Review 1983, Vol. 1: Planning and Policy
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In 1985, a local team was formed in the Municipality to
evaluate the development situation in the center. By 1987, the
"Kuwait Town Master Plan Review and Updating"' was completed,
the main goals of which were focused on determining and setting
controls for development density, introducing restricting rules to
implement study recommendations, and developing a system to
implement, monitor, and follow-up decisions.20 The study included
a comprehensive survey and documentation of each parcel and
structure in the center. A comparative analysis was carried out for
projected development areas and the number of jobs produced by
both the existing FAR and that proposed by the Master Plan.
Projections estimated from the existing FAR revealed alarming
numbers for future development in terms of development capacity,
employment numbers, and required parking spaces and other
services. The study recommended some options for solving the
problem which included land exchange for private development,
cancellation of government commercial development, restrictions on
Building Code implementation, and encouragement and hastening
of public residential projects [Fig. 64].
The 1987 study represents the first attempt carried out by
local professionals and produced by the Municipality. Although the
study dealt only with specific areas of the Master Plan (development
capacity and the implications resulting from changing Building
Code and zoning) the study team managed at least to survey and
document the prevailing situation. A realistic inventory of land
parcellation, structure use and conditions was recorded for the first
time.
* This study is summarized in Appendix A.
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[Fig. 64] 1987 Municipality Review Study
Source: Kuwait Municipality, Kuwait Town Master Plan Review and
Updating. Kuwait 1987
[Fig. 65] The Kuwaiti village
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As a result of the 1987 study, decision makers became more
aware of the land development issue in the center; they realized that
the government should confront this issue and take further action
to deal with it. By the late 1980's, a freeze was put in effect on
commercial developments, traffic and road projects including the
urban expressway (extension of the First Ring Road) in the center,
and any increase in FAR was banned. Top government officials also
developed a greater awareness and concern about the aesthetic
appearance of the city, revival of old traditions and the past.
Kuwaitis managed to dismantle the traditional city and
eradicate the memory with which it was associated. In the late
1980's, about two-thirds of the city center was empty. At that time,
the people and the government realized that their city was missing
something they could not identify, something to do with its
traditional spirit. After establishing and reconstituting themselves as
a modern society, Kuwaitis regretted the demolition of the tradition-
al city. They became sentimental about their lost traditions. Both the
memory and nostalgia of the past became important. A three-
quarters scale Kuwaiti village was built in the city center on the sea
shore [Fig. 65]; it was built to remind the young generation of their
history. The Municipality of Kuwait, supported by the Amir and the
government, initiated a strong preservation movement. The
merchant families renovated their diwaniyas in the old city and now
proudly use them as an emblem of their prominent past. Men again
felt inspired to wear their traditional dress as an expression of their
national identity.
Kuwaitis were trying to revive the collective memory, but
they organized it in a distorted way. Only the elements that suited
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[Fig. 66] Safat Square competition proposal, 1982
Source: DEVECON OY & INCO, Safat Square Summary Report, 1982
[Fig. 67] 1980's vision for the center
Source: Architetti BBPR, The Study of Kuwait City Environmental
Improvements, 1986
[Fig. 68] Abdullah Al-Ahmed Street Competition Entry
Source: Pan Arab Consulting Engineers, Kuwait, 1990
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their purpose and ideology were preserved to express their past and
history. Kuwaitis were selective in both the deconstruction and the
reconstruction of their memory.
The 1980's were distinguished by the multitude of commis-
sioned buildings and urban projects, and by the studies for improv-
ing traffic congestion and public transportation system. A number
of public buildings, banks, small-scale urban areas, and restoration
projects were also implemented; none of the large-scale urban
design projects proposed in the Master Plan reviews were executed
due to government indecision and cost.
Some selected projects of the 1980's demonstrate both revival
of memory and history, as well as the government's realization and
awareness about bolstering the city center's image. "Kuwait City
Environmental Improvements" by Architetti BBPR of Italy is an
attempt to upgrade the quality of the environment in the center and
giving the city a particular and consistent character. The study for
the Sharq Al-Sief area included the architecture and urban design for
the National Council of Fine Arts and Culture headquarters, crafts
village, housing, and their surrounding area. The recent competition
for developing a design concept for Abdulla Al-Ahmed Street to be
the identity street for the center, which was also called "Kuwait's
Champs Elysees," expressed Kuwaitis' desire and eagerness to have
a distinctive and beautiful city center. However, these studies did
not respond to the center's urban and aesthetic problems
[Fig. 66,67,68].
In late 1989, the British firm Shankland and Cox, and W.S.
Atkins, in association with a local firm, were appointed to undertake
the third review of Kuwait Master Plan. The key objectives were
how to accommodate expected future growth, taking into account
that committed land in Kuwait City was almost exhausted, and that
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the new towns and major district centers that were proposed in
earlier reviews were not built."
In early 1990, Kuwait was embarking on another develop-
ment boom. The local economy was recovering from the 1980's
recession; it had become solidified and financially stable, balanced
by large cash reserves and foreign investments. The general idea
was to redevelop the center and prioritize institutional, cultural and
recreational projects, create a coherent urban character for the city,
increase development density in the center, encourage young
Kuwaitis to return to and reside in the center, and rely more on the
private sector for all aspects of development.
The 1990's ambitious plans and policies for the redevelop-
ment, repopulation, and beautification of the city center did not last
too long. The Iraqi invasion made all these future plans irrelevant
and created a panic situation for Kuwait's government and people.
Policy makers had to reconsider the government's priorities. Public
projects have been either delayed, postponed, or canceled. More
concern has been given to national security, national defense, and
postwar reconstruction. For the second time in the history of the
city, the collective memory had undergone an attempt to eradicate
it, this time by a foreign force.
In the current situation, the land market is not active and the
private sector is waiting until further actions are taken by the
government. The postwar policies will eventually effect both
property and land markets, not only in the center but in Kuwait
City in general.
Recently, the KMPR3 consultants resumed their work and
studies. In a paper presented by the technical director of W.S.
Atkins in a conference held in London in May, 1991 for rebuilding
Kuwait, several strategies were proposed for future development
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addressing issues of decreasing the population, redundancy in
services, population distribution and density, as well as issues
regarding the replanning of Kuwaiti residential areas and redevelop-
ment of the city center instead of building the new towns.
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Chapter 5: The Factors that Caused Land Vacancy
Introduction
In the Middle East, the political and economic changes that
followed the Second World War created previously unknown city
problems like rapid growth, uncontrolled large-scale developments,
introduction of wide roads, destruction of the old traditional city,
and loss of the city's character and identity. Cities in oil-producing
countries suffered more than other cities in the region. With the
increase in oil revenues and lack of local expertise, European
intervention and ideas were welcomed. In Kuwait, the abundance
of both resources and desert land coupled with the desire for
modernity and newness facilitated the application of new planning
theories and ideas.
Kuwait City exemplifies the weakness of the traditional
British planning system, a two-dimensional physical plan based on
demographic and employment projections, development densities
to accommodate these projected numbers, traffic and transportation
planning, and infrastructure demand. The planning process did not
incorporate social, cultural, political, and environmental issues in a
meaningful manner; it did not recognize public participation as a
major factor for reaching planning decisions. Comparing structure
plans for the city center with recent maps and aerial photographs
reveals that the majority of vacant land is zoned for residential use.
According to 1971 Master Plan studies, the government owns the
majority of the total land available for development, and 50% of all
residential land in the center, of which only 10% is developed. The
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privately owned land, which is mainly concentrated in Mubarakiya,
Desman and Qibla areas, is 82% developed.' The government could
not develop this residential land because Kuwaitis refuse to live in
apartments. Commercial and government buildings were not
developed on government land because of other government
priorities, pressure from landlords, and fear of increased traffic.
Except for a few cases, privately owned residential zoned parcels
were not developed because they did not yield profit compared to
commercial developments.2 My analysis revealed that, in addition
to the international events that have taken place during the past five
decades, there seems to be no one reason or single factor that led to
the phenomenon of land vacancy in the center of Kuwait City. In
order to diagnose the causes of the problem we need to define the
main actors and their roles in this process: the government, the
private sector, the planners, and the institution (Kuwait Municipali-
ty). The accumulation of events and the combination of active roles
in the planning efforts explains the occurrence of a considerable
land vacancy in the center. -
The Center in the early 1950's
[Fig. 691 A sequence of city center's plans showing the progress of demolition and
expansion of vacant land since the early 1950's
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The Role of the Government
The state, represented by its government, has the ability to
command the economy through the control of oil revenues and to
maintain the national economic viability through the involvement
of the private sector. With all its good will and good intentions, the
government itself initiated the problem. The highly inflated land
acquisition policy (valuation policy) was not meant to gain control
over land, but as a means to benefit the largest number of Kuwaitis
possible. However, this policy did not only create value for the land,
it also triggered wild speculation and generated a false land and
property market. Through its actions, the government established a
powerful economic class that had the ability to exert influence on
land development and plan implementation in the center. With the
availability and abundance of capital and limited investment
opportunities, real estate and land speculation dominated all other
national economic activities in Kuwait. Land acquisition does not
yield profit for the government, yet it consumes a significant
segment of government revenues.
By the late 1970's, as a result of the inflated valuation policy,
the debts accumulated by the government reached a level where the
government had to take action to curtail land acquisition. Although
the principal cause of the 1982 stock exchange crash (Souq al-
Manakh) was the extremely inflated values for shares in the market
because of false speculation,3 the government's restraining action
was another factor that led to the crash.4 Both the land acquisition
and valuation policies resulted in extreme fluctuations in the land
market, especially in light of the absence of taxes and other tools to
control land development. In Kuwait's city center, land can sit idle
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indefinitely; there is no carrying cost or any other pressure for
development.
The policy of not competing with the private sector in real
estate development left the government unprotected against the
influence and pressure exerted by the private sector. Other policies
adopted by the government, such as the aspiring development
program and the extremely generous welfare system, over-burdened
government responsibilities and financial commitments. The
government in Kuwait had to provide everything for its people
without yielding any kind of profits or revenues; it became
incapable of delivering its commitments, and the government was
forced to decide on its priorities in developing the city center.
The Private Sector
The private sector's influential role has a long history; its
economic power became undeniable. Land owners constitute an
active pressure group in the government, municipality, and on the
Municipal Council. Initially, they managed to claim both unregis-
tered parcels within the city wall and large tracts outside the wall.
The private sector pushed the Municipal Council to acquire much
more land than needed for public projects in the city center, and at
very high prices. The intervention of the private sector influenced
the form of both the city and the city center; it encouraged horizon-
tal, low-density city expansion and discouraged city center develop-
ment except for commercial use.
By the mid 1960's, the government had begun to allow the
sale of unbuilt parcels in the newly subdivided residential neighbor-
hoods while the Municipality was simultaneously acquiring and
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subdividing land in areas even further from the center and in excess
of the actual demand. The private sector's influence extended to the
implementation process of the Master Plans through intervening
and changing zoning regulation and the Building Code, which were
manipulated to satisfy their greed. The increase of commercial
development density in the center, and the inevitability of an
increase car volume delayed the development of more government
buildings. Even in estimating the feasibility for land development,
land owners considered the large residual value gained through
speculation and inflated land valuations to be a fixed cost, and thus
maintained continuous pressure for upgrading FAR.5
In the 1970's and 1980's through the Parliament, the private
sector strongly opposed and eventually prevented the government
from selling its excess land in public auction; they did not want the
government to compete with the private sector and increase the
land supply in the center. In the process of the city center's
development, the influential private sector played a major role in
using and abusing government policies and twisting building laws
to suit their personal interests, disregarding the interests of others
and the public good.
The Planning Process
In Kuwait as a general pattern, crises are often followed by
calling in experts and commissioning studies. The accountability of
these studies is questionable; very few were considered for actual
use in the past. For example, studies and reports in the early 1960's
and 1970's warned the government against the inflated land
acquisition policy, but politicians and decision makers underesti-
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mated the repercussions of their policies. A high Kuwaiti official's
comments on the implementation of plans: "plans are theoretical,
need and urgency dictates planning"; he also quoted an Arab maxim
"you plan and fate will mock you."
The imported ideas of modern planning theories of the 1950's
and 1960's were applied regardless of their suitability and relevance
to the locale. The plans and reviews for the city of Kuwait were
rigid and fixed; they did not view the city as a dynamic and
continuous process. The plans could not accommodate the political,
economic, and social changes that are part of this region's nature.
The plans encouraged decentralization and low density by propos-
ing an extensive road and highway network, new secondary
commercial centers, and villa-type residential neighborhoods--the
city kept expanding and dependency on cars became inevitable. The
concept of concentric and radial roads catered only to car movement
and created isolated, self-contained residential neighborhoods.
The 1971 Master Plan suggested the fragmentation of the old
commercial area; there was no necessity for banks and old souks to
remain in the center (core area). The European idea of replacing the
city wall with a green belt was proposed in the first plan and
emphasized in the following plans and reviews; however, except for
one segment, the Green Belt has never been green. More important,
by delineating the Green Belt area, the 1952 plan created a limited
city center that does not have the capacity for expansion, while at
the same time all the radial roads pour into this limited area. At the
time, Kuwaitis knew little about the different concepts of planning--
all they wanted was the newest and the best.
The 1971 Master Plan neither demonstrated an understanding
of the culture nor provided incentives for the social changes
necessary to facilitate implementation. The Plan suggested that
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well-off small Kuwaiti families should move into the center and
low-income Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis should move out; the
opposite became the actuality. In the 1970's, abandoned old Kuwaiti
houses were occupied by low- income non-Kuwaiti residents at a
low rents.'
KMPR1 suggested that 60% of the center's employees would
live and work in the center, and that laborers would live and work
outside. What happened was that employees of the center (govern-
ment employees are mainly Kuwaitis) ended up living in villas in
the suburbs and commuting to the center for work, while laborers
lived in old houses in the center and commuted to work outside.
KMPR2 predicted that at least 95,000 people would live in the city
center; in 1985, no more than 45,000 did.'
In the Master Plans, issues of a quality urban environment
such as greenery, cityscaping, preservation, character, and identity
became secondary. The questions of how people use the city, how
they interact with its elements, and how the city looks and feel were
not adequately addressed. People need protection from fast cars in
the streets, the hot sun, glare, and dust. Protected environments
such as shopping malls and covered souks are inviting and attractive
places for pedestrians and shoppers. The major weaknesses and
shortcomings of the plans, reviews, and studies were that there was
neither an agreement on a vision for the center nor urban environ-
mental controls. Some local planning officials think that previous
plans and reviews have adequately addressed and dealt with the
center's urban and environmental issues. However, the evidence
contradicts their assumptions; for example, rather than walking
outside, people use the climate-controlled shopping malls for
crossing from one block to another.
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Except for some cities in the Gulf such as Abu Dhabi, Al-Ain
and Muscat, where decision making power is highly centralized,
implementation of large-scale urban projects is extremely difficult
in this part of the world. In spite of recommendations for control-
ling the process of implementation, little was achieved. The Master
Plans recommended actions such as building parking garages and
widening roads, rather than adopting incentive and disincentive
policies such as taxing cars and increasing parking fees. As a result,
the government ended up being responsible for providing every-
thing without having any means to control and enforce its policies
and plans.
The long, cumbersome and detailed studies did not take into
consideration the inevitable transformation factors: the commitments
of the government, the influence of the private sector, and the
capacity for implementation. The plans and studies assumed that
the government is the sole financier for all large-scale and long-term
commitment projects. They forgot that the government in Kuwait is
not a beneficiary and does not generate revenue from its people.
The public was not involved in the planning process or allowed to
participate meaningfully in making planning decisions.
The Role of the Municipality
Rational planning is easier to implement through a single
strong central authority and one jurisdiction system. Because of the
limited local capacity, the Kuwaitis had to make use of the British
when establishing their institutional system, which depended on a
high level of public control. The Municipality of Kuwait is the
central and only institution responsible for the physical planning
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and land control, all the way down to food inspection and garbage
collection, from the national level to the local level. It has full
power, authority, and control over all of these activities. The
Municipality is overburdened with these responsibilities to the
extent that coordination between Municipality departments and
with other institutions became a real problem. For example, the
Building Code was changed by the Municipal Council without
consulting the Planning Department. Moreover, there is an overlap
and duplication with other ministries' tasks such as highways,
highway beautification, and parks and greenery.
With the strong leverage group in the Municipal Board, the
Municipality of Kuwait became a principal and active player in
creating the problem of land vacancy and under-utilization of the
city center. Except for a handful of implemented projects, Munici-
pality projects have been either delayed or cancelled. The Municipa-
lity's performance is handicapped by its own internal manipulation
and disorganization. There is no single management system to
address issues related to the aesthetics and imageability of the city
or changes in the physical environment, memory and identifying
symbols of the place. The Municipality of Kuwait could not address
and articulate the city center's problems and define requirements for
improving the urban quality of the city center when the plans and
studies were commissioned.
Even while the Municipality was trying to solve some of the
city center problems, it created some new ones. It gave incentives
without regard to their repercussions. The incentives given for
building parking garages provided additional parking spaces; at the
same time this action adversely affected the street facade and
attracted more cars to the center. It is true that the private sector is
more efficient in both utilizing resources and implementing projects;
137
nevertheless, some form of guidance and control for private sector
performance is still needed.
In addition to the factors previously mentioned, climatic,
cultural and social issues had their impacts on the center's develop-
ment. In the past, different lifestyles generated special development
patterns in the city,8 and the traditional lifestyle resulted in the
dense organic form of the old town of Kuwait. For Kuwaitis,
owning a parcel of land and a villa became the symbol of being
privileged. Sharing services and establishing social relationships
with neighbors were concerns which prevented the Kuwaitis from
living in high-rise residential buildings in the center. In Kuwait the
built environment is mainly dictated by the lifestyle, tradition, and
culture of the people, as well as by the natural environment; these
aspects must be taken into consideration in studies, because failing
to do so will hamper the implementation, causing delays and
cancellation of projects.
I would like to stress that the goal of my analysis is not to
criticize for the sake of criticism, but to define the obstacles that
delayed the development of the city center to its full potential. The
analysis clarifies what should be avoided in the future and what
should be focused on. Otherwise, this study will be redundant and
useless; it will only add one more study to the numerous earlier
ones.
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Part III: The Future
How to Deal with the Problem of Land
Vacancy
The analysis in Part II revealed that the previous plans for the
center of Kuwait City had failed to achieve their goals for develop-
ing the center. In spite of the numerous plans, reviews, and studies,
the center is still suffering from discontinuity and disintegration in
its physical form. So far, the plans for the city center have not
succeeded in creating a liveable and attractive urban environment.
In order to achieve better solutions, lessons from previous
experiences need to be considered and applied in the future. There
is no doubt that Kuwaitis are the pioneers in establishing such
large-scale planning; they are committed to maintaining the
continuity of planning efforts. However, the planning approaches
that were adopted in the past did not demonstrate their success in
developing the center as a significant locale. The plans and their
subsequent reviews and studies neither defined a vision to act as a
framework for proposed solutions nor produced design guidelines
for controlling the center's urban environment. They did not
respond adequately to local conditions such as a social, cultural, and
outdoor environment. Previous solutions for the center underesti-
mated the capacity for carrying out the plans; they did not take into
consideration the institutional barriers and private sector's influence.
The other lesson to learn is that the Municipality (the only
authority responsible for developing the center) has its own
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institutional weaknesses and shortcomings. In addition to its
multiple tasks, it suffers from the overlap of different roles and
responsibilities. For example, the Municipal Council, which is the
highest decision-making (a non-technical) body in the Municipality,
has the power to override the technical committees' decisions. There
is no single authority for managing the center's development
problems nor a mechanism for addressing issues and reexamining
planning concepts. In the past, the Municipality's main concerns
were focused on commitments to and compliance with the plans,
without respect to their appropriateness and relevance.
The crucial lesson to be learned from history is that public
policies and planning endeavors should not be inflexible. Without
a continuous reviewing process, government policies may lose their
usefulness and begin creating other problems. The government also
needs to be more critical and assertive in choosing different
planning approaches, rather than leaving these important decisions
to uninvolved parties. From the historical analysis in Part 1I, it
seems that having a visionary framework, effective mechanisms for
carrying out plans, and a self-reevaluation process are much more
important than merely producing plans and studies. To insure the
success of the planning efforts in Kuwait, it is essential to focus
initially on selecting a vision, then on assessing implementation
capacity, and finally on developing a detailed physical plan. The
mistake made in the past was in taking these priorities in reverse
order.
In this part of the thesis, I will try to explore alternative
approaches for dealing with the problem of vacant land and its
implication on the imageability of the center. The main subjects for
discussion are: first, the creation of a high quality urban environ-
ment for a city center with a unique character and special identity;
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second, a better use for the vacant land. In order to accomplish
these objectives, a general framework plan and program are
suggested before any further recommendations are made. Designing
and planning city centers is a major and complex task that requires
multi-discipline skills and comprehensive data; therefore, I will limit
my proposal and recommendations to the general policy level.
The first chapter in this part (Chapter 6) will list the existing
constraints and available resources, discuss questions and issues that
need to be addressed, and propose possible visions for the city
center. Having a vision is a prerequisite step that should precede
any decision with regard to the center; it is extremely hard to decide
on what to do without envisioning the end product. A clear and
definite vision will delineate the framework for the end product and
make the process for rebuilding the city center possible. The second
chapter of Part III (Chapter 7) will deal with implementation issues
such as how to develop a program for implementing and carrying
out the vision and how to organize and carry out this whole effort.
There will be a set of recommendations regarding who should be
responsible for implementing the vision, who should pay, what
changes are needed, what kind of public intervention is required,
and what policies and strategies are to be adopted in order to
ensure the success and continuity of this process.
143
144
Chapter 6: The Vision for the City Center
Resources, Concerns and Constraints
Kuwait City Center enjoys many natural assets and unre-
stricted resources that can be utilized for upgrading its urban
quality. The most valuable assets are the sea and the shape of
Kuwait Bay. For the time being, the seafront is underutilized and is
separated from the city center by the Arabian Gulf Road. The
underdeveloped waterfront offers an opportunity to integrate the
city with the sea and to use the sea view, activities, and port to
revive the sea life and restore its influence on the city center's
vitality. The proposed Green Belt offers another opportunity to
improve the city center's micro-climate and to fill the Kuwaitis'
intense desire and need for greenery and lushness. The vacant land
itself is an asset for creating an identifiable city center if it is
developed according to a set of rules and controlling measures.
Another asset is the continuity of some of the center's original
functions: the seat of government, the major financial and commer-
cial activities, and the functioning souqs and special retail shopping
areas.
The present city center is not dead, it has maintained some
of its original functions despite the demolition and destruction; no
major effort is required to attract business and employment-generat-
ing activities. The recent momentum resulting from both the
postwar reforms and reconstruction offers another opportunity to
accelerate the rebuilding of the center, making a one-time large-scale
effort possible. Now is a good time to rethink the city planning
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policies and to rebuild the society by creating new values that are
compatible with the newly created context. Recent government
policies such as rejuvenating the city center character, repopulating
the center by encouraging Kuwaitis to live in it, and more reliance
on the private sector for boosting the national economy and
redevelopment projects, could all facilitate the rebuilding effort if
used in a productive manner and not abused.
Since Kuwait has significant financial resources, cost would
not be expected to be an issue, but previous government policies,
the Iraqi invasion, and the Gulf War left the Kuwaiti government
burdened with debts, huge reconstruction bills, and considerably
less revenue. Consequently, cost is an issue that needs to be
considered at least in the short term, and the government is already
considering some form of taxation and the charging of fees for
public services.' For long-term policies with regard to redevelop-
ment of the center, cost should not be a big problem since the
government has already bought the majority of the land and gained
control over its development. The government also enjoys the power
of the highly centralized authority which makes the implementation
of urban projects and city planning much easier than in other coun-
tries.
The cost issue is an example of how some opportunities can
turn into constraints if misused and poorly managed. Constraints
may also turn into opportunities. For example, the preserved
structures from the traditional city may stimulate new projects and
add richness to their design; at the same time, old structures may
cause some kind of design restriction either by their location, size,
or use. Another example of this kind of dual effect is the new
telecommunication tower, which may enhance the silhouette of the
city center and act as a landmark and new focal point for concen-
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trated high-rise buildings, yet it dwarfs all surrounding structures
if it is not integrated with the height restrictions at the center.
Some of the physical constraints on the development of the
center are: the existing form of the city and the unrelated different
architectural styles; developments only at the edges of the blocks;
the city road network;* and the isolation of the city from the sea by
the Arabian Gulf Road.
Future plans for the center should not overlook natural
constraints such as the extremely hot summer, the sun's glare,
duststorms, water scarcity, and soil quality. Overlooking these
natural factors will jeopardize the success of any plans for improv-
ing the quality of urban life in the center and restrain landscaping
and greenery projects.
New plans for the city center should take into account social,
political, and cultural concerns. Kuwaitis were reluctant to live in
apartments until recently, when the National Housing Authority
gave some incentives and made an exception to the waiting period
(4-6 years) for villa-type housing applicants willing to live in high-
rise buildings. Land scarcity and underutilized infrastructure
became a major problem for public housing in Kuwait City. The
new government policy is to encourage Kuwaitis to live in the
center regardless of the cost to the government. Social values such
as status, a high rate of car ownership, and a servant dependent
society, constitute another constraint on city center development.
Political instability and decisions have also imposed new constraints.
* Seven major roads lead to the center; currently three of these
are expressways, more are planned to be upgraded to expressway
standards.
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The increased security measures require even more distance around
public buildings.
The planning process adds to the constraints and concerns
regarding future solutions for the land vacancy problem. The
government's insistence on implementing the 1971 Master Plan
discounted all other approaches and possibilities for developing the
center. Reviews following the plan did not challenge the concept,
they only reviewed numbers and details. In the process of rebuild-
ing the center, all development plans should seriously take into
account facts that eventually influence and delay these plans.
Factors such as the influence of the private sector and the limited
local technical capacity have played a major role in the mismanage-
ment and delaying of projects in the past.
Any effort to deal with the problem of land vacancy in
Kuwait City center should acknowledge the contextual difference of
this place, and that solutions which may have worked in other
places may not necessarily succeed in this place. Understanding
local conditions including available resources, constraints, and
concerns makes future plans more realistic and easier to implement.
Development Questions and Issues
In order to develop the center of Kuwait City, decision
makers need to consider some important questions and issues that
may influence future plans and visions for creating liveable and
attractive place, a usable center where life continues day and night
and throughout weekends and holidays. Such broad questions as:
what changes need to take place, and whether it is easier to change
one variable or more; whether it is easier to change the physical
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environment or social behavior, (and which is practical or possible);
and what was the cost and outcome of past experiences, financially
and socially, should precede any decision related to the develop-
ment of the city center. The vacant land needs to be redefined as a
place that has the sensory qualities of security, belonging, attach-
ment, and historical continuity, that evokes emotions and memory,
that has human scale and a sense of order, hierarchy and orienta-
tion.
If Kuwait's people and government want to rebuild the city
center, they will have to accept and deal with the car problems and
traffic congestion generated by that development. The criteria for
high-density or low-density development should be based on
demand, utilization of infrastructure, and improvement of urban
qualities. Low-density development may attract fewer cars to the
center, but that would mean people would travel longer distances
within the city, which is an unproductive way of utilizing the city's
resources of land and infrastructure. Higher density development
raises questions of housing in the center, such as who is to live in
the center and which levels of income to accommodate. Housing
development should not exclude groups of people from housing in
the center since this might create social and political problems.
Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, lower and higher income people should
all be able to use the center equally.
Questions related to the natural environment may, in the end,
be the main decisive elements for envisioning the future center. The
features that contrast with the desert environment--water, green,
and shade--should be the central theme for potential visions. The
sea represents the element of water; integration of the city center
with the sea is fundamental. Future visions have to consider
solutions for the treatment of the sea edge (soft or hard, distance
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from water, height along sea front, and control of tide and ebb tide).
Activities attracting people, such as restaurants, special retail and
entertainment, as well as residential projects have to be located
directly on the waterfront, either by depressing the Arabian Gulf
Road or by using its air rights in some areas.
The other natural element that makes a dynamic contrast
with the desert is the greenery and landscaping. Greenery projects
need not consider vast green open spaces and lawns because of both
water scarcity and the need for protected areas. Dense groves are
more suitable for Kuwait's climate; they provide usable shaded
areas and prevent heat from touching and reflecting from the
ground. Plans for the city center should not ignore the undeveloped
Green Belt, its use, function, and integration with the center.
Questions of greenery are strongly related to those dealing with
climate and weather protection, the third natural element.
Providing shade and weather protection is a necessity for any
development plan to make the city center usable during the hot
hours of summer days. Urban design for the center must take into
consideration glare, duststorms, and humidity, and must also
minimize the use of large open spaces and paved reflective
materials. Providing protection from the severe climate makes city
center activities more accessible for pedestrians; protected areas
create an urban life separated from the car-oriented environment.
Issues of controlling the public domain shape the framework
of plans aspiring to upgrade the quality of the built environment in
the center. An effort should be made to design the cityscape without
designing the buildings and to control the relationship between
public and private activities. Decisions should be made about what
kind of public infrastructure is needed. Street facades must be
controlled and unifying elements introduced. The city center should
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have an attractive public appearance for both pedestrians and cars.
Dealing with the public domain includes questions regarding
aesthetics and symbolism, such as how to create a city center that
has an individual, unique, and cohesive character. Designing
buildings individually does not create a city character and does not
express special values. Designs for urban landscape and settings
give cities their distinguished character; a few tying elements such
as trees, street furniture, arcades and setbacks, help to produce the
desired effect. There is always the danger of misusing these tying
elements--they should not be used as cosmetic and face-lifting
means.
The center of the capital city needs to express the national
identity and the national pride of Kuwait State. The issue of re-
asserting the Kuwaiti identity has acquired even more importance
since the Iraqi invasion. National identity might be expressed by
means of built form such as vertical elements, landmarks, bridges,
and boulevards. Other social and cultural traditions such as souqs
and mosques may also express national identity. For example,
Kuwaitis and other people of the Gulf dress in traditional garments
to identify themselves from other nationalities. Cultural expressions
such as music, dance, local dishes, even special smells and aromas
are all means for identifying a group of people. The history of a
place and the collective memory of its people distinguish the
regional identity (which all the Gulf States share) from Kuwait's
national identity.
New developments in the city center have to be sensitive to
issues related to the past. People should be able to read the history
of the city from its monuments and the remaining structures of the
traditional city. Symbolic elements that are meaningful to the
collective memory should be preserved as reminders for future
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generations. However, future plans and visions should avoid the
recreation of the past and the simulation of representational features
of Islamic architecture. Preservation of the collective memory can be
enhanced by building memorials and museums. Preservation and
revival of traditions and rituals is one way to maintain the continu-
ity of history--for example, the celebration of weddings and other
social occasions, religious ceremonies, the annual seafaring festival,
and the spring desert camping. Qualities of other cities in the region
might be examined and used as models for inspiring new plans for
the city center.
The city center should not only express its past, but also its
present and its promises for the future; it has to cater to all sections
of society. Since 40% of the Kuwaiti population is less than 15 years
of age, plans need to provide facilities for children and teenagers as
well as for men, women, and elderly people. Planners need to keep
in mind the specificity and uniqueness of Kuwaiti social life and
problems; for example, it is a conservative society that still main-
tains some kind of segregation between men and women. The
introduction of mixed-use and more entertainment activities may
solve some of the social problems of teenagers and young genera-
tions resulting from boredom and lack of leisure and free time
activities. At the same time, preservation of social activities such as
diwaniyas is one way of maintaining the continuity of history and
traditions as well as providing the older generation of men with
social gathering places.
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Potential Visions
In order to restore a sense of place to the city center and to
create an environment that is not alien to the residents, the people
of Kuwait need to have a vision acting as a framework plan for the
future. They need to share a common story about their city in order
to re-establish a sense of strong attachment and love for the city. In
the process of creating a vision, some questions need to be ad-
dressed, such as: what kind of place inspires Kuwaitis; which cities
they like to visit; and what values they adhere to (the built form of
any vision should express these values, needs, and the desires of
people). Decision makers should have an idea about the kind of
center they want, its functions, its use, and its physical and visual
character. They should have a clear idea whether to develop the
center as a significant and liveable place or to justify its current
state. The following alternatives may shed some light on future
possibilities and clarify the pros and cons of each. There are
limitations for each scenario; the final decision depends on the
balance between the cost and benefits for each.
Vision 1: The Capital City Center, Symbolic and Monumental
Examples: Washington, D.C., New Delhi
The two examples used are cities built to be capital cities, but
they differ from Kuwait City in terms of scale and the messages
they relay. Both Washington, D.C. and New Delhi signify power
and legitimacy; they have symbolic meanings that are expressed in
the architecture of their buildings, the wide thoroughfares, the
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geometry, symmetry, and axiality. In this vision, the center of
Kuwait City would be the administrative, financial, and ceremonial
center. It would contain central elements of power such as politics,
finance, and religion.
Located at the core of the center where all radial roads
intersect with the Arabian Gulf Road would be the focal point, the
new Amiri Diwan Project (the Sief Palace, Amiri Diwan, office of the
Crown Prince, and Council of Ministers), all decision-making
government offices, the Parliament and Planning Board, as well as
the financial districts which include the Stock Exchange, Central
Bank, commercial banks, and other financial activities. The Souq
would retain its vitality as a main retail shopping center where
people do specialty shopping. Other commercial activities, head-
quarters, and business-related services would also be situated in the
center, in addition to cultural and entertainment activities. Preserved
structures from the traditional city such as houses of the old
merchant families, mosques, and diwaniyas would remain in the
center beside new low-density housing.
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The center would function as a symbol for the old city and
its collective memory: it would contain the major elements of the
collective memory such as the gates of the wall, the seafront, the Sief
Palace, and the Souq. These elements would form major focal points
and landmarks beside other monumental public and private
buildings. In this scenario, the center would consist of a large-scale,
coarse-grain, low-density development--mostly public buildings
owned by the government. Monumental government buildings
would have formal settings and landscaping which would give the
center its grand and prominent appearance. Buildings would be
developed along wide roads with trees on both sides since pedestri-
an movement would be limited to the souqs and some commercial
areas.
The public domain would be observed mainly by car, and the
public open spaces would mainly serve as places to view such
things as formal public gardens and water fountains. The cityscape
and street furniture would be highly unified and design controlled.
The waterfront would be part of the formal landscaping; it would
be planted and used for enhancing the ceremonial appearance of the
Arabian Gulf Road. Some limited entertainment activities would
need to be introduced, such as walkways protected by trees along
the sea's edge, children's theme parks, and theme gardens.
This vision places more emphasis on the visual quality of the
place than the use of the place; it emphasizes city imageability and
the expression of power and history. It has the advantages of
providing security for public buildings, attracting fewer cars to the
center, and maintaining the land reserve in the center for future
public projects. The monumental center establishes the missing
character and creates a dignified image for the city. Since the
government has the leading role in this option, it will have more
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control on the urban design and fewer entanglements with the
private sector. Development of the private sector must conform to
the monumentality and grandeur of public buildings; it is also
subject to highly restricted design controls to ensure the desired
vision.
However, this option has its drawbacks and disadvantages.
It underutilizes valuable land in the center and encourages low-
density and urban sprawl, which act to extend the city's infrastruc-
ture and increase travel distances. Paved open spaces increase
reflected heat and glare; additionally, they require continuous labor-
intensive maintenance and upkeep. Other disadvantages of this
option are the absence of life in the center, especially at night,
adding cultural activities such as a national theater or a music hall
could fill this need. This option may satisfy the government policy
and desire to rejuvenate the character of the center and introduce
prestigious public buildings; at the same time, it reverses other
government policies and priorities to encourage the development of
the private sector and decrease reliance on expatriate labor.
Vision 2: The Oasis City Center, Green and Symbolic
Examples: Bahrain and Al-Ain in the United Arab
Emirates, and Basrah in Iraq
The second option for a low-density development vision is a
city center dominated by dense green. Although two of the
examples, Al-Ain and Basrah, are not capital cities, the example
cities can be used as models for this type of green city. The outskirts
of the cities are planted with palm groves, with smaller trees and
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plants underneath (citrus trees, vegetables, and herbs are usually
grown under the groves). Inside the city, palm trees provide
protection for domestic gardens, small parks, and private court-
yards. Vines such as bougainvillea and climbing shrubs such as
jasmine thrive in hot climates. These kinds of greenery provide the
place with the missing sensory qualities-the colors of the bougain-
villea that contrast the desert colors, the scent of jasmine at night,
or the orange blossom scents in the spring. Tree-shaded areas not
only improve the aesthetic image of the city center, but also provide
practical aspects such as usable open spaces, a protected pedestrian
environment, and shaded car parks.
In this vision, the center would maintain its present function
as the location of the seat of government, decision-making govern-
ment offices, the financial center, souqs, special retail, commercial
and service activities. High-density low-rise residential complexes
that respond to social, cultural and climatic issues would be
developed on vacant land. The center would express its symbolic
meaning not only in the built form, but also in greenery and
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landscaping. Settings for public buildings and open spaces would
be densely planted with trees. The type of trees and planting hierar-
chy and order would provide unifying and tying elements. Through
the control of building, the center would acquire the desired
distinguished character and unique identity. Formal landscaping
could enhance the monumental architecture of the buildings,
especially for existing structures. This vision has the capacity to
integrate the underdeveloped Green Belt and cemeteries in the city.
Developing the Green Belt as a dense grove would define approach-
es to the center and give them a significant presence. Planting the
seafront and developing it as a soft edge for the center will enhance
the city center's character and create an inviting place for both
entertainment and residential purposes.
Advantages of this option are many; in addition to the
micro-climate improvements and the provision of usable open
spaces, it creates a special character for the city center. It satisfies
the local need for lush greenery and enables people to use the
center throughout the heat of the days and seasons. Implementing
this solution might appear difficult and costly because of water
scarcity, soil quality, and laborious maintenance; it might, however,
be easy to implement since changes will include only one element.
This option also has its disadvantages. For example, security is a
main concern as groves provide easy hiding places and public
buildings surrounded by trees are more difficult to protect. The
other major concern is the practicality of implementation; the
government would have to import large numbers of palm trees.
Nevertheless, other cities in the region such as Abu-Dhabi managed
to solve these problems. Like the first vision, this solution does not
address government policies of repopulating the center, encouraging
the private sector, and decreasing expatriate labor.
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Vision 3: The Metropolitan City Center, Services and Mixed-Use
Examples: Cairo, Beirut
Old capital cities in the region used to have centers that
contained all kinds of activities; governmental, administrative,
financial, commercial, residential, entertainment, and cultural
activities. Old cities like Cairo and Beirut used to have all their
public services concentrated in the center; hospitals, schools, the
university, wholesale markets, daily and specialty shopping
markets, and special crafts shops. In this vision, the future center of
Kuwait City is envisioned to be a high-density urban center that has
diverse activities.
Like Visions 1 and 2, the center would be the hub of the
major government, financial, commercial, and retail activities.
Additionally, the center would have a high-density, probably low-
rise, residential area and all related services such as hospitals,
clinics, schools, shopping centers. These residential developments
would be situated on vacant land overlooking the sea and the Green
Belt; they would be fully integrated with the seafront's lively
entertainment and cultural activities. Residential developments
overlooking the Green Belt would take advantage of both the view
and the use of greenery; similar to the second vision, the Green Belt
would also be developed into a continuous dense grove.
In order to attract people to live in the center, the view and
advantages of the sea front and the Green Belt should be fully
utilized. Therefore, high-rise residential developments with
imaginative architectural design need to be employed to avoid
monotonous large-scale housing. However, building heights do not
necessarily need to be restricted and uniform in all of the center.
Variety is the main character of this vision. Different areas in the
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center may have different characters, different levels of design
control, and different urban environments. In this option, the center
would cater to all sections of society regardless of their level of
income, social status, or nationality.
Unlike the previous visions, the center here would not have
a unified character or one dominant use. In general, the center
would have shaded areas created by densely developed buildings,
protected sidewalks and arcades, trees alongside sidewalks, and
inward-looking building complexes. Public open spaces would have
either artificially controlled climates like atriums, or small-scale
planted courtyards that would lead to climate controlled commercial
and residential complexes or to pedestrian malls. The distinctive
character and special identity would not necessarily be expressed by
individual buildings. Climate protection elements could be used to
give a sense of uniformity--for example, the use of sun shading
devices, a minimal use of openings and glass, with projections and
canopies to protect those openings. These are simple unifying and
tying elements that would reflect the spirit of the place and heighten
its aesthetic appearance. The public domain would be represented
by the varied city texture and fine-grain activities, and pedestrians
would have more interaction with public urban spaces. The center
should cater to both cars and pedestrians, to public and private
activities.
This option for Kuwait's city center vision has many advan-
tages. The service center would conform to government policies of
bringing back the life and character of the center and encouraging
development through the private sector, as well as provide weather
protection, and integrate existing structures with new development.
This solution may have some major drawbacks, nevertheless it
should not be discounted as a viable option. High-density develop-
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ments would attract cars and generate traffic congestion, noise, and
environmental problems. These problems are unavoidable; any
solution for developing the city center to its full potential would
have to address them to a greater or lesser degree. Cities around the
world have managed to develop their centers and accommodate a
higher volume of cars.
Implementing this vision would necessitate financial and
technical resources; it would involve both a capable technical staff
and a strong authority to monitor and control the development
process. Moreover, this vision would require some fundamental
changes and reforms of social behavior and public attitudes. The
government would have to use incentives to encourage Kuwaitis to
live in apartments, use public transportation, and be less dependent
on servants. To date, plans for repopulating the city center and
forcing people to use public transportation have had no significant
success in achieving these goals.
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Vision 4: The Shaded City Center, Core and Periphery
Example: Istanbul, Isfahan
Cities like Istanbul and Isfahan are much older than Kuwait
City; the physical structure of these cities represent the time in
which they were built. The purpose of using these two examples is
to exemplify the type of environment that this vision is trying to
achieve and not to recreate the past. The objective of this vision is
to create an environment that is sympathetic to pedestrians and
their movement in the city; places and activities in the center should
be accessible during both day and night, despite heat and weather
changes. The center would be divided into the core and the
periphery. The core area would contain the top level government
center, the financial district and the State Mosque. This core center
would represent the three historical symbols of power: religion,
politics, and finance. It would be monumental and ceremonial in
character. This part of the center would be mainly accessed by car
by the top government officials and employees of both government
and financial centers.
Unlike the core, the periphery would contain retail, commer-
cial, entertainment, and related services; it would integrate existing
activities and preserved structures such as mosques and diwaniyas.
At the street level, there would be a network of protected public
spaces such as atriums, courtyards, arcades, and narrow streets.
These public spaces would be interconnected and would lead to the
waterfront entertainment and cultural activities from both sides of
the core. Entrances and lobbies of public and private buildings
would be linked to the pedestrian systems by means of planted
public courtyards and defined open spaces. Residential town houses
would be located on the waterfront, taking full advantage of the
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sea's pleasant features and periphery activities. Residential units and
semi-public gardens, playgrounds, and shaded car parking would
be located above the street level.
The periphery's character would be defined by the continuity
of uses, the visible crowdedness, and the ambient qualities of the
place, qualities such as the excitement of experiencing the sequence
of transitional spaces and feeling the contrast of light and shade.
The dominant elements of the character would be the sensations of
enclosure, discovery, protection, safety, continuity and diversity.
People in the center would prefer to use this pedestrian route if they
wanted to cross from one place to another and avoid the torridity.
In this vision, the center would have two different characters: the
formal and symbolic character of the core, which would be
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experienced mainly by car; and the informal and lively character of
the periphery, which would only be experienced by pedestrians. The
public domain in the center would also be divided between cars and
pedestrians; each of these sections would require different controls
and guidelines. Pedestrians would observe their immediate
surroundings (the interconnected corridors and lobbies of the
ground floor that would constitute the periphery of public domain),
while people using cars or public transport would observe larger
expanses of the city center. This option creates a tying base for
scattered existing buildings and old structures.
This vision has the advantages of creating an environment
that reflects both the culture and climate, as well as defining a
special character that expresses the spirit of the region. It provides
protection, safety, and social interaction for pedestrians, and
productively utilizes the city center's valuable resources of vacant
land and the seafront. The drawbacks of this vision include
difficulties in controlling the implementation process and providing
urban design guidelines. Implementation would require substantial
technical and financial resources.
This option may encourage private sector development and
private sector participation in building the public infrastructure, but
the question is whether there is enough demand for this scale of
development, considering the recent government policy of reducing
the population. Unless an efficient practical public transportation
system is introduced and disincentives and discouragement
strategies are employed, this option will attract large numbers of
cars to the center. The government's priority, however, is to rebuild
and repopulate the city center; dealing with cars is an issue that will
be encountered in any development plan.
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Vision 5: The Futuristic City Center, Environmental Control and
High Technology
This vision may look extravagant and unrealistic, but in a
rich country like Kuwait that has limited population resources and
an extremely harsh environment, a solution like this is justified. In
addition to its existing activities, the city center would have more
government and public buildings, commercial, entertainment, and
cultural activities. Housing might be introduced, depending on
development density at each block. The center would be divided
into islands; each block being a self-sustaining separate entity. There
would be an artificial climate-controlled superstructure in each of
the center's blocks, and a large open space or atrium would function
as a terminal for the "superblock."
This open space would link underground parking garages
with the street level's enclosed pedestrian activities, public transpor-
tation, and other "superblocks" by means of above-street bridges.
The entrances of public and commercial buildings would open into
this space. The main open space might be linked to secondary
public spaces such as gallerias and covered arcades. The main
elements that would characterize the space are combinations of state
of the art technology and natural elements such as heavy greenery,
light and shade control, and the possible extension of the sea into
the city. Roads and street facades would mainly serve cars and
public transportation; the controlled environment would be used
strictly by pedestrians.
Like Vision 4, this solution would isolate the world of the
pedestrian from that of the car. It would provide safety, protection,
and a pleasing character that reflects the sense of newness and
modernity among the younger generation and which reflects their
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state of mind and outlook. It might be difficult to adopt and
implement this kind of vision due to its heavy cost, the huge
technical resources it would require, and the risk of using hi-
technology. Nevertheless, it is worth considering this option,
because it would be a one-time effort that would dramatically
change the physical environment of the city center. This vision
would conform to government policy of decreasing dependency on
expatriate labor and increasing reliance on technology.
In reality, this vision would continue the history of modern-
ization in Kuwait and add another step in the process of recreating
a better image for the traditional city. Kuwaitis need the courage to
admit that the past has been destroyed and that the reality of the
present is imposing itself. There is no point in regretting the
demolition of the traditional city--let Kuwaitis continue what they
started forty years ago, be less sentimental about their past and look
forward to a future of affluence, progress, and achievement.
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In order to decide on a future vision, Kuwaiti decision
makers have to keep in mind that there is no one solution that can
solve all of the city center's development problems. Each one of the
proposed options has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Decision makers have to ensure that the solution is not worse than
the original problem and must also continuously question the side
effects on other objectives. Financial and social costs should not
outweigh benefits. It is not the intention of this study to decide on
the future vision for the city center of Kuwait. The final decision
should be made by the Kuwaitis, taking into account the usefulness,
appropriateness, and acceptability of the vision. They should also be
mindful of the local technical capacity as well as the capacity and
practicality of implementation. They may decide on one exclusive
vision or they may choose to select certain elements from each
vision, or to combine two or more visions. In any case, the future
vision for the center of Kuwait City should be clear, simple, and
easy to implement.
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1. Jonathan Crusoe and Peter Kemp, "Kuwait: Rebuilding a Country (MEED
Profile No. 6)." London: EMAP Barness Information Ltd, 1991. p. 5.
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Chapter 7: Implementing the vision
Introduction
The possible visions proposed in Chapter 6 are only general
ideas to act as a broad framework for directing future plans for the
center. These different alternatives need to be further developed into
development plans. This chapter will discuss the broad guidelines
for the implementation process. In order to decide on how to deal
with land vacancy in the center and what kind of public interven-
tion is required, there must be a general process to guide the
implementation of the development plan, a process that defines the
common elements of each vision. Government policies and actions
may differ, depending on the vision. The process of redeveloping
the city center and restoring its environmental qualities is a
continuous piecemeal process; it has to take into account changes
and incorporate feedback from implementation. It is a process that
has the capacity for self-regeneration and updating and which has
the flexibility to accommodate changes.
The first part of this chapter will define the bodies responsi-
ble for making decisions, financing, and the execution of city center
plans. The second part will discuss changes which need to take
place, and the alternative policies and tools that need to be em-
ployed for implementing each of the visions. There will be no
attempt to examine and employ models used in other cities and
countries due to the difference in the nature of the problems,
cultural and contextual differences, and the limited technical
capacity in Kuwait.
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Responsible Bodies
The government of Kuwait is the main financier of urban
improvements and the provision of public infrastructure. Incentives
and transfer of benefits policies can be employed to encourage the
private sector to build public infrastructure in the city center. A high
level of maintenance and upkeep costs should be expected and
provided for both the government and the private sector.
In most cases, the control of a city's urban environment is
easier through highly centralized authority. The government should
make use of its centralized power and establish an authority which
is only responsible for development in the city center and the public
domain. The City Center Redevelopment Authority should have a
separate independent entity and strong political support; it should
also have the power to override the Municipality and Municipal
Council.
The authority is responsible for keeping an inventory for
projects in the center; it should also be responsible for the coordina-
tion of these projects, the institutions involved, and coordination
with the private sector. Moreover, the authority should also be
responsible for establishing and updating a central data base for
parcels in the center. In general, the City Center Redevelopment
Authority must take the initiative for controlling changes in the
urban environment of the center, planning, developing, and
following up. It should also be able to address issues and questions
regarding memory, symbols, character, identity, aesthetic values,
and sensory qualities; changes in the issues such as the transforma-
tion of memory, symbolic meanings, and public attitudes should
also be monitored and addressed. Cities like Boston in the United
States and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia have established redevelopment
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authorities to control the public domain and large-scale projects in
the city. The authority may take different forms depending on the
future vision, degree of control and details required. Establishment
of more than one authority is also possible, but would entail more
coordination problems, competition among different authorities, and
the provision of a highly qualified staff.
This central authority needs to be independent from all
decision-making bodies and be directly responsible to the highest
authority of the state to ensure its legitimacy, power, and indepen-
dence; it needs to have special jurisdiction, power of enforcement,
and its own budget. The authority needs a strong and charismatic
leader with a solid political backing. This leader, whether an elected
individual like a mayor, or an appointed director, must have a clear
vision for the center's image and its aesthetic appearance, is much
more effective than a committee. To ensure the inclusion of all
parties concerned, an authority council or board needs to be
established; it should be constituted of professional and non-
professional members and should include members from the
Planning Board, Municipal Council and Chamber of Commerce. It
should also include individuals who have an intellectual back-
ground, as well as an interest and concern about the city aesthetic
appearance.
Since the leader of this authority does not necessarily need to
be a technical person, he must have technical advisors to help in
addressing and articulating questions and issues. The authority
should also have a highly qualified and experienced staff in
different disciplines to propose initiatives and make decisions.
Additionally, there should be one or more multi-disciplinary
committees, as well as panels and commissions to control public
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domain by means of introducing design guidelines, design reviews,
and design competitions.
The City Center Redevelopment Authority cannot function
without private consultants, both local and international. Although
the local experience is limited, the input of the locals is essential in
the redevelopment process. International consultants also have an
important role in guiding the planning and development efforts;
they should have their own resources for conducting research and
studies to understand the locale and the cultural differences.
Additionally, the international consultants employed should have a
continuous presence to monitor the process, get feedback, and train
the local technical staff. Kuwaitis should take advantage of other
cities' experiences and the methods used to deal with their prob-
lems; Kuwaitis may use some of their techniques and instruments,
or they may share exchange programs with other cities authorities
or research institutions.
The city belongs to the people who live and work in it, and
public facilities in the center are meant to be used by the residents
equally. Therefore, the public should also share in the process of the
redevelopment of the center by participating in making decisions for
the future city center. There are two levels of participation: the
private sector and the inhabitants of the city. The input of vacant
land owners, contractors, real estate companies, and building
material trading companies is important especially at the beginning.
Future plans for the center should take into account both the
interest and the influence of the private sector.
Although the public participation process should not exclude
some groups of society, the issue of who is to participate, and in
which way, is important. Since only a limited percentage of the
society is educated, there is a risk in involving people who have
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difficulty in conceptualizing their views and attitudes.' Although
some people may be extremist and very subjective, efforts should
be made to take their opinions into consideration. Education and
dissemination of information by means of the media, especially
television and radio, are the most effective ways to overcome this
problem. Initial decisions and policies need to be reconsidered as
political, social and economic changes and the degree of involve-
ment and responsibility of each of the concerned parties may change
over time and take other forms.
Policies, Techniques, and Tools
Before any government intervention, some fundamental
changes in government policies and government attitudes need to
take place in order to be able to implement development plans for
the city center in Kuwait. Policy alternatives and policy choice are
highly dependant on which vision is applied; the adoption of
implementation techniques and tools also depends on the vision and
what it is trying to achieve. In the past, public policies such as
inflated land acquisition, a generous welfare system, and a non-
taxation system did not only create the problem of land develop-
ment within the center, but also intensified it over time. Moreover,
the absence of disincentives policies and regulation enforcement
tools--especially among influential Kuwaitis--allowed the private
sector to influence and delay the implementation of the previous
plans.
To stimulate the development of the vacant land in the center
of Kuwait City, some public policies need to be reconsidered. To
encourage development on empty private land, the land acquisition
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value should not exceed the market value in order to control
speculation and make development feasible. Additionally, a larger
reform might be considered; a form of taxation, either on vacant
land or on incremental value, might be required, not as a source of
revenue for the government, but as a tool for incentive and
disincentive policies. Since land taxation is not easy to introduce and
implement, and since the government is the prime land owner in
the center, land taxation may not be very effective. Other measures
must be examined to encourage development on government land.
The government has already invested in the land in the city
center; to avoid complications resulting from selling the land and to
maintain its control on both land and development, the government
should only lease the vacant land. The government should use the
lease contract as leverage to enforce building regulations and urban
design guidelines for new developments. To ensure a high quality
of development, leases should not be less than twenty-five years
with a guaranteed option for renewal. If the government wants to
encourage high-density development in the center, some additional
actions, such as restricting urban boundaries and imposing fees on
infrastructure, should be taken.
Higher density in the center attracts a larger number of cars.
In the past, incentives to build parking garages in the center did not
succeed; more cars were attracted to the center because of the
increase in FAR, which was not coupled with any kind of counter-
ing disincentives. In order to discourage cars and decrease traffic
congestion, some different disincentive policies and different
measures are possible. For example, the government could impose
high taxes on car imports and gasoline, and/or higher fees on
parking in crowded areas of the center. The government should also
introduce impact fees and linkages on higher density complexes.
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Furthermore, traffic management techniques such as the introduc-
tion of high-speed lanes for public transportation and high occupan-
cy vehicles might discourage people from driving their cars
individually. The provision of an efficient public transportation
system that takes into account social and climatic constraints could
also minimize the number of cars approaching the center.
Other public policies which indirectly delayed the develop-
ment of land in the center and hampered government priorities,
such as the building of government offices and public infrastructure,
also need to be reexamined. For example, policies involving ideas
that the government should not make a profit from the people, or
that the government should be responsible for providing all public
services without charging fees, left the government burdened with
responsibilities and increasing financial commitments.
The public housing policy is an added pressure on the
government; it does not have the land or the construction capacity
to meet the growing demand. In the center, government land zoned
for residential use is empty. Residential uses in the center need not
necessarily presume only low- and middle-income housing. The
government should also give incentives to the private sector to build
housing, such as mixed-use developments and rental housing. Since
rental housing is primarily built for non-Kuwaitis, encouraging the
private sector to build rental housing might oppose government
policies of repopulating the center with only Kuwaitis. Recent
postwar policies of decreasing Kuwait's population by one half of
what it was before the invasion, and preventing male expatriates
from bringing in their families, will certainly decrease the demand
for new development, be they public and private services in the
center or rented housing outside the center.
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Planning and urban design policies also need to be reviewed.
A major decision has to be made whether to maintain and continue
the British planning system (the use of the 1971 Master Plan and its
reviews as city center development plan) or to divert to more up-to-
date and innovative city planning and urban design theories and
approaches that have the capacity to sustain changes and uncertain-
ties. It is the government's responsibility to decide who should
design the new plan and how to carry it out. To ensure the
implementation of plans, building regulations and guidelines, the
government must have some enforcement and deterrent powers. If
private real estate companies and private landlords want to increase
FAR they have to pay for it, either by paying linkages and impact
fees, or by transferring benefits such as building public infrastruc-
ture. Government incentives for stimulating development in the
center should be accompanied by desincentives for discouraging
cars from coming into the center.
Through the authority responsible for the city center, the
government should introduce strict building regulations and clear
detailed guidelines in order to control the urban environment and
the aesthetics of development in the city center. Depending on the
future vision of the center, different design guidelines need to be
introduced, such as urban design methods and a powerful set of
rules that deals with contextual issues and issues of appropriateness
such as how to address context, what type of measures and tying
elements are needed to connect buildings to each other and to their
surroundings, and what types of setting and landscape characters
are required. Additionally, design guidelines introduce a set of rules
to control scale relationship, height, shade, bulk, material, color,
general architectural features, expression lines, and setbacks for
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buildings. Different degrees of regulations might be used for
different zones in the center.
Writing the design guidelines may take place over time,
depending on goals and objectives. To ensure adherence to design
guidelines and to control the process of improving the quality of the
built environment, design reviews are essential. Design review
committees may take different forms and adopt different proce-
dures; it is important to decide who should be on these committees
(planners, architects, landscape architects, private landowners, and
contractors), whether to have single or multiple design review,
whether it is binding or not, and how to ensure compliance of
recommendations.
To improve the image and aesthetic appearance of Kuwait's
city center, urban design policies should take into account the
control of the public domain, which includes everything experienced
by the public such as building lobbies, public entrances, arcades,
public spaces, and public buildings.
In order to facilitate the implementation of the plans, public
policies are also needed to change some social values and to
encourage people to change their lifestyles, adapt to postwar
realities and be able to participate in the planning process. Educa-
tion and information are very effective tools, as are incentives and
desincentives. The government should make the effort to build up
a significant Kuwaiti professional class, encourage public awareness,
and establish an active, educated and cultured class that is able to
take the initiative and make decisions.
Different potential options for Kuwait City center's future
vision will require different strategies and different public interven-
tion. What follows is an attempt to examine each vision in terms of
policies and changes required for implementing a specific vision,
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policies for developing the vacant land, creating a distinguishable,
unique character, and restoring a sense of place to the city center.
Vision 1
In this vision, the government is the prime land developer in
the center. Unless the private sector is encouraged to build public
infrastructure on public land through incentives and transfer of
benefits such as density bonuses (if demand for development
resumes) or alleviating taxes if they exist, the government will
mainly own and maintain the public infrastructure. So far, past
experience has proven that the government alone did not have the
capacity for developing its land in the center. Therefore, the
inclusion of the private sector is a necessity. The government may
conditionally lease some of its land to the private sector for quality
commercial and residential usage. Parts of the vacant land located
on the waterfront might be used for prestigious, high quality
residential high-rises to take full advantage of sea view; design
guidelines for buildings' relationship to the sea would have to be
established.
Design guidelines are the major tools for implementing this
vision; they will have to be clear, detailed and highly restrictive.
Public buildings as well as private buildings should adhere to these
guidelines; a special planning commission should be created to
control the public appearance of the center. Design guidelines
should deal with issues of style, bulk, height relationship, expres-
sion elements, vertical elements, monumental features such as
domes and sculptural roofs, materials, ornamentation, and most
important, controlling the use of Islamic architectural features.
178
Commercial and residential developments should also comply with
these guidelines.
Another set of design guidelines which are equally important
would include the landscape, type of trees, setbacks, fountains,
street furniture, street lighting, and visible services. Design guide-
lines are also required for the waterfront with regard to the height
of development, distance from the water, soft and hard landscapes,
and access to the water. Preserved structures must also have
guidelines for integrating these structures into new developments
in the center; these guidelines should address questions of use and
context (depending on the number of preserved structures), whether
to rebuild the fabric and what type of infill to introduce, and
whether to preserve the structure and its use, preserve the structure
and change the use, or preserve only the use and special activities.
Vision 2
This vision needs to have concentrated areas of green in the
center, in addition to the formal green landscaping of public
buildings and the flora used in private developments. In order to
have some concentrated green areas, the government may need to
have some land exchange in center. Since the greening is a major
priority for the government, it may either increase development
density as an incentive for planting part of the green area, or it may
allow the private sector to become the direct implementing party.
The scale of greening the center--soil improvements, provision of
irrigation water, provision of trees, maintenance and upkeep--will
generate large-scale business for the private sector and boost the
national economy.
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Design guidelines for the buildings and greening the center
have to be specific about types of trees, distance between trees,
relationship of different trees and plants, shade, fountains, and open
spaces. They should visually explain that the concept of the green
center does not imply vast lawns similar to public parks and
common gardens in Europe and the United States. The implementa-
tion of this vision should be coupled with a major information
campaign at the national level to build an awareness of the greening
policy.
Vision 3
The approach for implementing this vision is entirely
different from those in visions 1 and 2. The goals and objectives of
this vision are the diversity of activities, its varied characters, and
small-scale development. In the center, the government has to lease
its land a large percentage of the private sector. In this case it is
difficult to maintain control of the urban environment unless the
government uses the long lease contract to stimulate development
and to enforce urban design guidelines and requirements in both
public and private projects. Different zoning and design guidelines
need to be introduced for different areas in the center, as well as
different levels of details and different degrees of control.
Design guidelines for integrating, linking, and unifying
different parts of the center are the only means of keeping control
on the general character and public domain. For example, design
guidelines should include street facades, arcades, sidewalks, public
areas, tying elements, and the street- and landscaping of city center;
these guidelines should be directly applied to individual project's
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architectural design. The different buildings should collectively
produce the desired unified image. This option requires rigorous
measures to curb high-density development impacts such as traffic
congestion, car parking, noise and pollution. The implementation of
a vision that suggests high-density development requires a substan-
tial technical staff and implementation capacity. However, it
maintains government control over land, encourages development,
and augments the role of private sector.
Vision 4
Implementing the vision of the shaded city, similar to the
third vision, also requires the government to lease its land to the
private sector in order to retain power. The government has to give
incentives such as changes of zoning and increases of FAR to
encourage the private sector to build public infrastructure that
constitutes the major elements of this vision, shaded areas, water,
and green. The government has the option of maintaining the
ground floor of the private developments for purposes of urban
environmental control and continuity of public access. The govern-
ment may also use these incentives for encouraging the private
sector to build housing or even partial public housing. Intensive
commercial entertainment activities (such as coffee shops, restau-
rants, cinemas, amusement arcades, and children's playgrounds) can
also be used as incentive for the private sector. In return, the
government will demand full control of the public domain.
In this vision, there should be two different sets of design
guidelines and requirements. One set would deal with the external
parts of the city center (parts seen from the car) such as building
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heights, architectural features, bulk, expression lines, arcades, and
street facades, in addition to elements of streetscape such as
sidewalks, setbacks, trees, street furniture and street lights. The
other set of design guidelines would deal with the internal pedestri-
an parts of the center (parts necessary for the pedestrians' comfort)
which would include atriums, courtyards, projections, shading
devices, shop frontages, signage, lighting fixtures, fountains, seats,
and indoor greenery.
The city of Phoenix, Arizona in the United States has been
identified as "the desert city"; its design review guidelines are
centered on the provision of shade that enhances the character of
the city. The design guidelines for Kuwait should take into account
existing structures in the center and questions such as how to
integrate existing atriums and lobbies to the pedestrian network, or
how to connect and blend preserved structures and activities such
as souqs, mosque forecourts, and diwaniyas. The relationship between
the city center and the sea is another development activity that
needs control by means of design guidelines and zoning for
different residential, entertainment, cultural, and retail activities.
Vision 5
In this vision, each of the city center's blocks act as an
independent entity. A joint sector has to be established to develop
and guide the large-scale mixed-use development. The government
and the private sector form a joint venture, whereby the govern-
ment's share is the provision of land, technical advice, and low-
interest finance. The private sector provides the design and develop-
ment of these blocks and part of the financing. Each block needs to
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be separately planned, zoned, and design controlled, depending on
the density of development and types of activities. In other
countries such as the United States, some cities have adopted this
approach with successful results. This process will take time, since
the two parties have to negotiate their terms and persuade each
other. In Kuwait, where technical capacity is limited and the culture
is different, the process of negotiation and persuasion might be
difficult to manage. However, these problems should not disqualify
this approach, especially if the proposed mechanisms take these
problems into account.
As in vision 4, the street environment has to be controlled
with design guidelines that deal with the external appearance of the
development such as street facades, access and exits to "super-
blocks" by cars or public transportation, height relationships, and
cohesiveness between different levels. In order not to create an
environment that is alien to people, streets and streetscaping also
require some environmental design control. Although each of the
blocks would have a special zoning and special design require-
ments, they all have to share some common elements such as the
use of water (probably blocks linked together by water canals from
the sea), use of dense indoor greenery, and the use of shading and
light controls. Design guidelines need to be introduced to control
the internal public domain such as the main public spaces, arcades,
secondary open spaces, atriums, lobbies, and main entrances of
buildings; additionally, design guidelines have to deal with quality
of internal elements such as material, color, seating areas, fountains
and the use of high-technology.
The different policies proposed for each vision demonstrate
that no decision can be made and no action can be taken without
having a clear vision that defines the general framework and the
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broad policies for the center of Kuwait City. The choice of policies
depends on the goals and objectives of the government; it also
depends on the changes and social reforms which the government
hopes to achieve.
First Steps
In order to bring visions into reality and effectively deal with
the problem of land vacancy in the center of Kuwait City, some
initial steps need to be taken. A steering committee (consisting
mostly of non-government professionals, intellectuals, and represen-
tatives of different interests in the city) should be formed to address
and deal with issues regarding development and aesthetics of the
center. The steering committee might begin with a citywide
enlightenment and information campaign targeting the highest level
of decision-making, responsible institutions, and the public. It
should first report to the top decision makers the current status of
the center, including land vacancy, imageability, and delays of
development, taking into account recent demographic changes and
their implications on services and development demands. Simulta-
neously, the committee should propose the establishment of a
redevelopment authority and advise on putting a freeze on the city
center's Master Plan and its reviews, investigate other planning
approaches, and suggest a list of new consultants and planning
institutes.
Second, the steering committee should contact all government
and non-government institutions that are involved in projects and
studies for the center and briefly get their evaluation for the status
quo. Members of the committee must have a comprehensive
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understanding of the nature and magnitude of the center's develop-
ment problems; they need to know how planning officials perceive
and deal with this issue.
The last and most important step is the large-scale education
and awareness campaign among all groups who use or have an
interest in the city center. The committee should directly get in
touch with the private sector either through some of its members or
through representatives to communicate their difficulties and
interests. Since most of the people in Kuwait watch television daily
and there are only two channels; using this medium for a wide
informational campaign would be very effective. Newspapers are
another useful medium for exerting a strong influence on the public.
Using advanced visual techniques for comparing the present center
with other city centers and with what could be achieved could have
a considerable effect on both the government and public. Once the
public's awareness and knowledge has been increased, the Kuwaitis
will be more able to envision and define their own urban environ-
ment.
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1. Mohamed AI-Rumaihi, interview with author in Kuwait 15 January, 1990.
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Conclusion
The study of the land vacancy in Kuwait's city center
revealed that the planning process in Kuwait has undergone delays
and difficulties which led to the existing state of the center. Some of
these delays and difficulties (such as institutional barriers and
inefficient implementation capacity) are more generic and occur in
other developing countries, whereas others are more regional and
are especially troublesome for the Middle East, including wealthy
countries in the Arabian Gulf. For example, turmoil and political
instability are part of the Middle East's nature, and have a tremen-
dous impact on a small and vulnerable state like Kuwait. The
Arabian Gulf countries not only share oil prosperity, but also have
some common dilemmas that are less apparent in many other
places. For example, because there is an abundance of capital, rapid
socio-economic transformations have a direct effect on urban
development.
Other components of the problem are less general and more
applicable to Kuwait in particular. The Kuwaitis could not
articulate their problems themselves; they mainly depended on
foreigners to do so for them. The Kuwaiti leaders neither agreed on
a clear vision for the future physical form of the center, nor clarified
their system for reviewing progress of policy, goals, and outcomes.
In order to address these problems, their attempts at solution were
mostly limited to initiating studies and projects, of which very few
were effective in achieving their objectives.
Additionally, planning officials did not want to confront the
reality that the plans and reviews were insufficient and inadequate
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in spite of the fact that a large part of the city center remains empty
and unbuilt after forty years of planning. They put forth no effort
to stop these plans and reevaluate their approach and methodology.
They did not question the failure of earlier plans to produce an
integrated and fully developed city center. In Kuwait, the urban
planning process has not only suffered from delays in implemen-
tation, but also from indecisiveness, confusion, and absence of
strong leadership.
In a turbulent regions like the Middle East and the Arabian
Gulf, future planners should always keep in mind that abrupt
political and socio-economic changes may upset plans at any
moment. Previous plans and reviews were based on assumptions
about population growth which, in Kuwait, is a very unpredictable
factor. In addition to their unrealistic premises, the plans ultimately
failed to incorporate changes in social patterns and to respond to
both the local culture and the natural environment. Issues and
questions related to future planning and development efforts should
be formulated by the Kuwaitis themselves. Before taking any further
actions, they need to clearly define a vision for their city center
which incorporates the prevailing needs of its people.
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Appendix A: Summary of Master Plans and
Reviews
The 1952 Master Plan
Plan for the Town of Kuwait
Client: Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah
Consultant: Minoprio, Spencely and P.W Macfarlane
Main objectives of the plan:
- The provision of a modern road system appropriate to the traffic
conditions in Kuwait.
- The location of suitable zones for public buildings, industry,
commerce, schools and other purposes.
- The choice of zones for new houses and other buildings needed in
residential areas, both inside and outside the town wall.
- The selection of sites for parks, sports grounds, school playing
fields and other open spaces.
- The creation of a beautiful and dignified town center, particular
attention being given to the treatment of the Safat and the siting of
public buildings.
- The planting of trees and shrubs along the principal roads and at
other important points in the town.
- The provision of improved main roads linking Kuwait with the
adjoining towns and villages.
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Planning Concept:
The Master Plan introduced the concept for a radial and ring
road system. It also introduced the residential neighborhood's
pattern. It separated the town from the neighborhoods by a green
belt as a buffer zone. It located new attraction areas other than the
town such as the Shuaiba industrial area, hospitals, and the new
airport. The plan paid considerable attention to roads and infrastruc-
ture which were previously deficient in the town. The plan allocated
a commercial area around Safat Square, government offices on both
sides of Abdullah Al-Salem Street, and an area for light industries.
Recommendations and Implementation Program:
- Build up a technical staff
- Set up a town planning committee
- Prepare a timetable for development
- Introduce building bylaws
- Place orders for building materials and equipment
- Survey lines of new roads and estimate number of houses to be
demolished
- Prepare layouts of housing areas to replace houses demolished
- Survey warehouse area and prepare plans for its redevelopment
- Select sites for the most important buildings, including hotels, and
prepare working drawings
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The 1971 Master Plan
The Plan for Kuwait Town and Plan Implementation
Client: Municipality of Kuwait
Consultant: Colin Buchanan and Partners of Britain
Main objectives of the plan:
- Kuwait Town is to maintain its importance as the state capital and
the principal administrative and commercial center
- Traffic problems need to be solved by minimizing car journeys to
the center
- Demographic composition in the center to be changed
- Kuwaitis are to be pressured to use public transportation
- Concentrated activities such as banks and old souks need to be
relocated and removed from of the center
- Activities are to be spread in a linear plan along the coast
- Commercial satellites are to be created in the center
- The city is to act as a buffer between the sea and the desert
- The desert is to be maintained for oil
Method:
- Decide the best size for the city center in the future (number of
people living and working in the center)
- Define upper limits for population and employment (target
number and not projected number) rather than defining physical
capacity
- Suggest 100,000 resident and 104,000 employment in the long-term
study (modified in the first report)
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[Fig. 70] 1971 Master Plan, proposed zones for the center
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners, The Plan for Kuwait Town, and
Plan Implementation 1971
[Fig. 71] 1971 Master Plan, proposed road network for the center
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners, The Plan for Kuwait Town, and
Plan Implementation 1971
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- Compare demand for building floor space and land to accommo-
date the assumed numbers of residents and workers, with the
capacity of existing buildings that would remain throughout the
short-term and with the area of land available for development. If
the demand exceeds capacity, population and employment levels
used are to be adjusted
- Prepare the plan for the town in five stages
Evolution of the Plan:
- Survey and analysis of existing pattern of activities, land use, and
road network
- Delineation of areas available for development (the total area, less
committed sites, preserved structures and infill sites)
- Delineation of environmental areas (parts of town having unified
use or character) and fixed factors (structures to remain)
- Analysis and projection of total population, employment, and
residents in the center; 110,000 employment and 100,000 residents
- Estimation of demand for building floor space and land required
to accommodate projected population
- Comparison of required land and land available for development
(land available was not sufficient)
- Projected numbers for population were modified to 95,000
employment and 80,000 residents
- Concepts for future expansion were analyzed, dispersed verses
concentrated core (government and commercial) activities. Three
main areas were designated for the future growth of the core
(areas for employment)
- Radical demographic changes were proposed; well-off small
Kuwaiti families were expected to move to the town. Low income
Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaiti labor are to be decreased
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[Fig. 721 1971 Master Plan, proposed environmental areas
Source: Colin Buchanan and Partners, The Plan for Kuwait Town, and
Plan Implementation 1971
- Three areas were defined as cohesive areas, (Sharq, Qibla, and
Mubarakiya) that have character and unity that the plan should
respect
- Landmarks such as the Sief Palace, Safat Square, the old harbor,
and wall gates were designated
- The City was divided into five broad zones of similar use or
character, each of which were divided into environmental areas,
(urban areas where environmental considerations take priority
over traffic considerations), with a total of fourteen environmental
areas
- The land vacancy and the visually broken image of the town were
acknowledged
- Issues related to landscaping and greenery were dealt with and
encouraged, especially the Green Belt
194
- Issues of character, bulk, and height were taken into consideration
- Problems of traffic, road network, public transportation, and
provision of short-and long-term parking, were dealt with
elaborately
- Policies for implementation were recommended: priorities for
development areas, conservation areas, densities, traffic, car
parking, public transportation, open spaces, and a Green Belt
- The Plan suggested the legislation of new laws to enforce the
implementation of the plan in addition to the establishment of a
Land Policy Authority
- Reviews of and modifications to the Plan were recommended on
a continuous and regular basis by establishing a strong department
to carry out this job
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The 1977 First Review of Master Plan (KMPR1)
Client: Municipality of Kuwait
Consultant: Shankland Cox Partnership (Britain) in association
with Salem Al-Marzouk & Sabah Abi Hanna W.L.L. (Kuwait)
Changes since the 1971 Master Plan:
Major changes took place during the implementation of the 1971
Master Plan
- Unexpected population growth
- Change in national income
- Changes in social life
- Amendment of the Building Code (to increase FAR)
Objectives:
The main objectives of the first review were:
- To deal with the problem of the demographic projection discrepan-
cy (the number for employment and residents resulting from the
implementation of all committed projects and proposals will be
182,000 and 117,000, compared with 95,000 and 80,000 according
to the 1971 Master Plan)
- Question the economic viability of the new level of development
- Question the severe traffic and environmental impacts of the new
level of development
Recommended Policies:
- Set a new maximum target for employment and residents in the
city center to be 140,000 and 117,000, respectively
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Source: Shankland Cox Partnership & SSH, Master Plan for Kuwait: First
Review 1977
- Commercial areas are to be consolidated around the Central
Business District, the Souk, Fahad Al-Salem Street, and subsidiary
center at Beloosh
- Restrict and possibly reduce FAR
- Civic and government uses will mainly be constructed in three
areas: Qibla, the Sief Palace, and Abdullah Al-Salem Street
- Remainder of the center is to be mainly residential
- The government needs to take initiatives to provide housing for
low-income groups, principally for non-Kuwaitis and bachelors
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- The Green Belt is to encircle the city center and contain recreation-
al facilities. In the center, major open spaces are to be located in
Safat Park, the Salhiya Cemetery, Sief Square, Al-Beloosh, and
extensive landscaping around the main public building complexes
- Some areas are to be designated as conservation areas such as
Behbehani Compound, the American Mission, the traditional souks
and part of the Sharq sea frontage, in addition to individual
palaces and mosques, which are to be preserved
- The existing road pattern is to provide the main access to the city
and is to be supplemented by an urban expressway formed by
extending the First Ring Road, which is to be depressed in some
parts
- Car parking spaces are to be provided for residential and non-
residential use, 35,000 and 63,000, respectively, and some form of
restraint on traffic movement is required in the near future
- A comprehensive public bus transportation system is to be devel-
oped, based on express services originating from other parts of
Kuwait as well as local city center service, and will operate from
two main bus stations
Method:
- Description of existing conditions and forecasts for: land use,
employment types and distribution, population growth and
distribution, land ownership, land values, the role of the private
sector, townscape analysis, transport and utilities
- A survey of all future plans and proposals for the development of
the center showed that each site in the center is committed.
Estimations were made for the future impacts of this development
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[Fig. 74] 1977 KMPR1, city center proposals
Source: Shankland Cox partnership & SSH, Master Plan for Kuwait: First
Review 1977
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- The Structural Plan for the center defined three major environmen-
tal areas (each having high-quality coherence, and character)
conservation areas, and special landscapes and open spaces
- The Structure Plan also defined land uses in the center and
proposed transportation structure
Recommendations for Implementing the Plan
- Recommendations were made for establishing a Central Planning
Authority responsible for data collection, following up schemes,
and implementing of plans
- Suggestions were made for continuous monitoring and updating
of the plan
- Action priorities and different development strategies were
prepared and analyzed
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The 1983 Second Review of the Master Plan (KMPR2)
Client: Municipality of Kuwait
Consultant: Colin Buchanan and Partners (Britain)
Objectives:
As described in the introduction of the final report, to update
the Master Plan to ensure that it continue to fulfill its purpose in the
light of changing circumstances. Some of these objectives are
attributed to the plan itself.
The most important factors that the Second Review dealt with
were the prospect of continued growth of employment and the
change of the Building Code.
Method:
- Review changes during the last five years and forecast future
needs accordingly
- Survey commitments and opportunities, both commercial and
residential, in terms of floorspace area and residential capacity
- Asses existing conditions of transport and traffic conditions
- Adopt population targets for the city structure plan to be 140,000
employment and 100,000 residents
- Estimate floor space requirements for employment, residential and
other services and activities
- Establish a growth strategy and preferred levels of floor space
- Define city center activities and land usage location
- Propose four special environmental areas (same use or character):
the Sief Palace, the Souk, Fahad Al-Salem Street, and the Qibla.
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Comprehensive environmental design studies to be conducted to
develop detailed building design guidelines, traffic and pedestrian
circulation proposals, planting and landscaping.
- Produce development controls for implementing the Master Plan,
such as control of floor space development, Building Code
changes, a traffic restraint policy and parking changes, landscape
implementation, and public transport services.
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1987 Study for the Redevelopment and Follow-up the
Master Plan for Kuwait Town
Objectives:
- To project future development capacity according to the existing
Building Code.
- To achieve the most appropriate development capacity
- To establish a new Building Code and enforcement regulations by
continuous monitoring
Method:
- Field survey and data collection to establish the first data bank for
each parcel and structure in the center in terms of use, area,
occupancy, ownership, age, and conditions
- Estimations of developed areas, number of jobs according to both
existing FAR and Master Plan proposed FAR
- Projections of the trend of increase in development and number of
employed according to both existing FAR and the Master Plan
- Projections according to existing FAR showed alarming results for
future development in terms of development capacity, employ-
ment numbers, and required parking and other services
Recommendations
- Recommendations regarding commercial and administrative
development capacity suggested: land exchange at the same price
(from private commercial to government residential); land
exchange for private commercial (from inside the center to
outside); cancellation of government commercial on public land;
and restriction of both land use and FAR.
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- Recommendations regarding residential development capacity
(government owns 81% from all residential land in the center)
suggested speeding up government residential development,
retaining government residential land for residential use only,
encouraging residential development, and enforcing zoning regula-
tions.
- Recommendations regarding roads, transportation and car parking
suggested some measures to control future growth, especially the
car parking fee policy in the center.
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